# 1nc

### 1NC Counterplan

**The United States federal government should establish a bilateral partnership with the government of Mexico against exploited persons.**

**Your “trafficking” discourse is steeped in ethnocentric language and western assumptions-This causes racism and otherization, which turns the case**

**Capous-Desyllas, MSW Portland State University, 7** [Moshoula, “A Critique of the Global Trafficking Discourse and U.S. Policy”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0CYZ/is\_4\_34/ai\_n25466118/]

Trafficking has been nationally and internationally defined through the use of ethnocentric language and western assumptions. Scholars use "trafficking" interchangeably with diverse concepts, such as: illegal immigration, modern slavery, prostitution, and the sexual exploitation of women. Trafficking definitions often fail to distinguish clearly between trafficking and voluntary consensual migration, often combining women's migratory movement with trafficking (Kapur, 2005). Furthermore, Piper (2005) asserts that trafficking has to be seen as part of the reality of migration patterns, mainly undocumented flows. Taking into account economic globalization, O'Neill (2001, p. 156) presents trafficking as "the total commoditization of human beings traded across borders, as is the case with any other good." Definitions of trafficking are highly contested among scholars, National Government Organizations (NGOs), feminists, and governments, thus posing challenges in conducting research studies, reporting statistics and making generalizations.

Historical Fears of Sexuality and Migration

The issue of trafficking came up within the international human rights discourse and took on a moral framework. The document that set the standard for the United Nations (UN) to continue further resolutions on trafficking and prostitution was the 1949 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and Exploitation of Prostitution of Others (Saunders & Soderlund, 2003), the first international instrument that dealt with trafficking as forced prostitution. Even though this was not ratified by all countries, it still served as a model for future legislation (Doezema, 2002a). The 1949 UN Convention represented an abolitionist notion of prostitution as exploitation and as being "incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person" (Ditmore & Wijers, 2003; Saunders, 2005).

Historical patterns in the levels of public concern in the U.S. over the trafficking of women and children are linked to periods of increased immigration (Saunders & Soderlund, 2003). The historical discourse on immigration and its links to trafficking is emphasized by Pattanaik (2002, p. 218) who states that "the term which was used to describe the ensuing abuses in the process of migration was 'trafficking.'" The U.S. immigration policies in the past are known for their racist, discriminatory, and exclusionary stances, out of fear for the "other," the unwelcome foreigner.

Racism, as it relates to sex trafficking, is raised as an issue for analysis by various feminists who critique the dominant sex trafficking framework. In response to the fear of 'white slavery,' Congress passed the White Slave Traffic Act in 1910, also known as the Mann Act. This act prohibited unmarried women from crossing state lines for immoral purposes and it criminalized interracial couples (Saunders & Soderlund, 2003, pp. 3-18). Under the Mann Act, in 1914 more than 70% of the convictions of women were related to the voluntarily transportation of women for prostitution or other immoral purposes (Saunders, 2005). Racist immigration laws passed in the 1920s, Immigration Act of 1924 and the Temporary Quota Act of 1921, led to strengthening U.S. borders and the restriction of migrants from Eastern and Southern Europe and Asia. The period afterward did not see trafficking on the U.S. and international agenda to such an extent or urgency as it was seen to resurface again in the 1990s (Saunders & Soderlund, 2003).

Doezema (1998, p. 44) describes how the 19th century sex slave was "a white woman, victim of the animal lusts of the dark races" and in the 21st century, the racism changed its focus to exaggerate the new sex slaves as "passive, un-emancipated women from the developing world." In the 1800s Chinese women and other women of color were viewed as overly sexual, deviant and promiscuous, as were Mexican women at the turn of the century. It was at this time that migration was on the rise so the government felt the need to create a moral fear and panic over "the other.'

A historical context of socio-political, religious, and economic perspectives in the U.S. situates the current U.S. policy within a racist, heterosexist, hegemonic framework that harms women through so-called 'protection' and continues to colonize. The different feminist perspectives of prostitution throughout history have also influenced policy and public ideas about trafficking and the need to 'protect victims.'

And, Discourse is specifically key in the context of anti-trafficking efforts-A) Excludes alternative readings B) Undermines policy action.

Musto, Women’s Studies Department, UCLA, 9 [Jennier Lynne, “What’s in a name?” Conflations and Contradictions in Contemporary U.S. Discourses of Human Trafficking”, Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 32, Issue 4, pgs. 281-287, pg. Science Direct]

Terms like “trafficking,” “smuggling,” “modern day slavery,” and “sexual slavery” are polemical in nature and demonstrate the tenuousness of assigning meaning to forms of exploitation that appear to resemble but nevertheless remain distinct from one another. Though modern day slavery may encapsulate aspects of trafficking, and while trafficking may extend to individuals who have been smuggled and/or sexually enslaved, the slippage between these terms renders them devoid of consistent and politically efficacious meanings. Conflated terminologies are not innately problematical per se, but become so when they exclude alternative readings and possibilities or conversely, when the terms fail to capture the complexity of the issues, thus creating a formidable disconnect between representations of the phenomenon and the actual embodied experiences of trafficked persons (Andrijasevic, 2003, p. 265).

For this reason, I echo Andrijasevic's (2003, p. 265) contention that “trafficking is an inadequate category”. In a U.S. context in which sexuality and border crossing have been at the fore of heightened state surveillance and discipline, the ability to achieve definitional agreement about what constitutes trafficking comes with a price, namely the insufficient identification, visibility, and protection of trafficked persons whose experiences do not align with dominant discourses. As Kim & Chang (2007, p. 5) observe, “the conflation of trafficking with prostitution has resulted in the narrow application of the TVPA to sex trafficking cases…and law enforcement agents often do not view those in other industries as victims of trafficking”.

Such issues underscore that the “domain expansion” of the term trafficking has not translated into the development of more sophisticated methods of detection for trafficking cases that are non-sexual in nature or proffered the ability to rethink the limits of state and federal labor laws. Rather, the rhetorical prowess of trafficking terminologies in a U.S. context has emboldened and diversified the U.S. government's fight against commercial sex vis-à-vis human trafficking policies (Weitzer, 2007). Like Kligman and Limoncelli, 2005 Gail Kligman and Stephanie Limoncelli, Trafficking women after socialism: To, through and from Eastern Europe, Social Politics 12 (1) (2005), pp. 118–140. Full Text via CrossRef | View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (4)Kligman and Limoncelli (2005, p. 130), I find it strangely ironic that “forms of slavery in the guise of trafficking are tacitly tolerated and indeed proliferated” despite the widespread global circulation of human rights discourses. While the ability to name and categorize human rights abuses like trafficking have grown more sophisticated, such naming practices have, to date, proven limited in translating modes of suffering, be they structural, systemic, interpersonal or otherwise, into theoretical and political strategies that prevent their emergence.

### 1NC Politics

#### Congress will ultimately compromise to avert shutdown

Tom Cohen, 9-20-2013, “Congress: will it be a government shutdown or budget compromise?” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/19/politics/congress-shutdown-scenarios/index.html?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn\_allpolitics+(RSS%3A+Politics)

There hasn't been a government shutdown in more than 17 years, since the 28 days of budget stalemate in the Clinton administration that cost more than $1 billion. Now we hear dire warnings and sharpening rhetoric that another shutdown is possible and perhaps likely in less than two weeks when the current fiscal year ends. Despite an escalating political imbroglio, the combination of how Congress works and what politicians want makes the chances of a shutdown at the end of the month uncertain at best. In particular, a rift between Republicans over how to proceed has heightened concerns of a shutdown in the short run, but remains a major reason why one is unlikely in the end. A more probable scenario is a last-minute compromise on a short-term spending plan to fund the government when the current fiscal year ends on September 30. After that, the debate would shift to broader deficit reduction issues tied to the need to raise the federal debt ceiling sometime in October. "There's going to be a lot of draconian talk from both sides, but the likelihood of their being an extended shutdown is not high," said Darrell West, the vice president and director of governance studies at the Brookings Institution. Government shutdown: Again? Seriously? Conservatives tie Obamacare to budget talks While the main issue is keeping the government funded when the new fiscal year begins October 1, a conservative GOP wing in the House and Senate has made its crusade against Obamacare the focus of the debate. They demand a halt to funding for the signature program from President Barack Obama's first term, and they seem indifferent about forcing a government shutdown if that doesn't happen. "I will do everything necessary and anything possible to defund Obamacare," Republican Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas said Thursday, threatening a filibuster and "any procedural means necessary." The GOP split was demonstrated later Thursday by Sen. John McCain, who told CNN that "we will not repeal or defund Obamacare" in the Senate. "We will not, and to think we can is not rational," McCain said. A compromise sought by House Speaker John Boehner and fellow GOP leaders would have allowed a symbolic vote on the defunding provision that the Senate would then strip out. The result would have been what legislators call a "clean" final version that simply extended current levels of government spending for about two months of the new fiscal year, allowing time for further negotiations on the debt ceiling. However, conservative opposition to the compromise made Boehner agree to a tougher version that made overall government funding contingent on eliminating money for Obamacare. Moderate Republicans question the strategy, but fear a right-wing backlash in the 2014 primaries if they go against the conservative wing. In reference to the divisions in the House, McCain said it was "pretty obvious that (Boehner) has great difficulties within his own conference." The House passed the tea party inspired plan on an almost strictly party line vote on Friday, setting in motion what is certain to be 10 days or so of legislative wrangling and political machinations. The measure now goes to the Democratic-led Senate, where Majority Leader Harry Reid made clear on Thursday that any plan to defund Obamacare would be dead on arrival. Instead, the Senate was expected to strip the measure of all provisions defunding Obamacare and send it back to the House. "They're simply postponing an inevitable choice they must face," Reid said of House Republicans. Here is a look at the two most-discussed potential outcomes -- a government shutdown or a short-term deal that keeps the government funded for a few months while further debate ensues. House GOP: defund Obamacare or shut government down Shutdown scenario According to West, the ultimate pressure on whether there is a shutdown will rest with Boehner. With the Republican majority in the House passing the spending measure that defunds Obamacare, Senate Democrats say they will stand united in opposing it. "Don't make it part of your strategy that eventually we'll cave," Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York warned Republicans on Thursday. "We won't. We're unified, we're together. You're not." That means the Senate would remove any provisions to defund Obamacare and send the stripped-down spending proposal back to the House. Boehner would then have to decide whether to put it to a vote, even though that could undermine his already weakened leadership by having the measure pass with only a few dozen moderate Republicans joining Democrats in support. If he refuses to bring the Senate version to the floor for a vote, a shutdown would ensue. "The key player is really Boehner," West said. Polls showing a decrease in public support for the health care reforms embolden the Republican stance. Meanwhile, surveys showing most people oppose a government shutdown and that more would blame Republicans if it happens bolster Democratic resolve. Compromise scenario Voices across the political spectrum warn against a shutdown, including Congressional Budget Office Director Douglas Elmendorf, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Republican strategist Karl Rove. "Even the defund strategy's authors say they don't want a government shutdown. But their approach means we'll get one," Rove argued in an op-ed published Thursday by the Wall Street Journal. He noted the Democratic-controlled Senate won't support any House measure that eliminates funding for Obamacare, and the White House said Thursday that Obama would veto such a spending resolution. "Republicans would need 54 House Democrats and 21 Senate Democrats to vote to override the president's veto," Rove noted, adding that "no sentient being believes that will happen." West concurred, telling CNN that "you can't expect a president to offer his first born to solve a political problem for the other party." "It's the House split that's causing this to happen," he noted. "People now equate compromise with surrender. It's hard to do anything under those circumstances." Under the compromise scenario, the Senate would remove provisions defunding Obamacare from what the House passes while perhaps making other relatively minor changes to provide Boehner and House Republicans with political cover to back it.

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### The plan would trade off with Congress’s ability to avert the shutdown---GOP has momentum and will, but they need literally every hour to get it done

Frank James, 9-13-2013, “Congress Searches For A Shutdown-Free Future,” NPR, http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/09/13/221809062/congress-searches-for-a-shutdown-free-future

The only thing found Thursday seemed to be more time for negotiations and vote-wrangling. Republican leaders recall how their party was blamed for the shutdowns of the mid-1990s and earnestly want to avoid a repeat, especially heading into a midterm election year. Cantor alerted members Thursday that during the last week of September, when they are supposed to be on recess, they will now most likely find themselves in Washington voting on a continuing resolution to fund the government into October. It looks like lawmakers will need every hour of that additional time. While talking to reporters Thursday, Boehner strongly suggested that House Republicans weren't exactly coalescing around any one legislative strategy. "There are a lot of discussions going on about how — about how to deal with the [continuing resolution] and the issue of 'Obamacare,' and so we're continuing to work with our members," Boehner said. "There are a million options that are being discussed by a lot of people. When we have something to report, we'll let you know."

#### Shutdown wrecks the economy

Yi Wu, 8-27-2013, “Government Shutdown 2013: Still a Terrible Idea,” PolicyMic, http://www.policymic.com/articles/60837/government-shutdown-2013-still-a-terrible-idea

Around a third of House Republicans, many Tea Party-backed, sent a letter last week calling on Speaker John Boehner to reject any spending bills that include implementation of the Affordable Care Act, otherwise known as Obamacare. Some Senate Republicans echo their House colleagues in pondering this extreme tactic, which is nothing other than a threat of government shutdown as neither congressional Democrats nor President Obama would ever agree on a budget that abolishes the new health care law. Unleashing this threat would amount to holding a large number of of the federal government's functions, including processing Social Security checks and running the Centers for Disease Control, hostage in order to score partisan points. It would be an irresponsible move inflicting enormous damage to the U.S. economy while providing no benefit whatsoever for the country, and Boehner is rightly disinclined to pursue it. Government shutdowns are deleterious to the economy. Two years ago in February 2011, a similar government shutdown was looming due to a budget impasse, and a research firm estimated that quater's GDP growth would be reduced by 0.2 percentage points if the shutdown lasted a week. After the budget is restored from the hypothetical shutdown, growth would only be "partially recouped," and a longer shutdown would result in deeper slowdowns. Further, the uncertainties resulting from a shutdown would also discourage business. A shutdown was avoided last-minute that year, unlike in 1995 during the Clinton administration where it actually took place for four weeks and resulted in a 0.5 percentage-point dent in GDP growth. Billions of dollars were cut from the budget, but neither Boehner nor the Republicans at the time were reckless enough to demand cancellation of the entire health care reform enacted a year before.

#### Global nuclear war

Harris & Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for** greater **conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any **economically-induced drawdown** of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, **acquire additional weapons**, and consider pursuing their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and **broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on **preemption** rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in **interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world

### 1NC T

#### Economic engagement is limited to increasing TRADE and FINANCIAL benefits

Haass & O’Sullivan ‘2K. Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Senior Fellows @ the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program. “Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy.” Pg. 5-6

Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid.’2 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market.’ Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of summits between leaders—or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign mffitary officers.’4 These areas of engagement are likely to involve, working with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement. This brief overview of the various forms of engagement illuminates the choices open to policymakers. The plethora of options signals the flexibility of engagement as a foreign policy strategy and, in doing so, reveals one of the real strengths of engagement. At the same time, it also suggests the urgent need for considered analysis of this strategy. The purpose of this book is to address this need by deriving insights and lessons from past episodes of engagement and proposing guidelines for the future use of engagement strategies. Throughout the book, two critical questions are entertained. First, when should policymakers consider engagement? A strategy of engagement may serve certain foreign policy objectives better than others. Specific characteristics of a target country may make it more receptive to a strategy of engagement and the incentives offered under it; in other cases, a country's domestic politics may effectively exclude the use of engagement strategies. Second, how should engagement strategies be managed to maximize the chances of success? Shedding light on how policymakers achieved, or failed, in these efforts in the past is critical in an evaluation of engagement strategies. By focusing our analysis, these questions and concerns help produce a framework to guide the use of engagement strategies in the upcoming decades.

#### Voting issue for limits and ground --- non-economic areas are huge, overstretch research burdens and require completely different strategies --- trade and finance allow sufficient flexibility but lock-in a core mechanism for preparation

### 1nc K

**Trafficking and sex worker discourse reinforces the construction of third world women as other-The aff creates a system where victims are in need of the good, benevolent, United States**

**Capous-Desyllas, MSW Portland State University, 7** [Moshoula, “A Critique of the Global Trafficking Discourse and U.S. Policy”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0CYZ/is\_4\_34/ai\_n25466118/]

Colonizing Views of Third World Women The media play a major role in the reproduction of racial stereotypes and in the construction of images that reinforce power hierarchies. Kempadoo (2001b) describes how the media portray the global sex trade as one-dimensional, where women are just "victims" of male violence, even though the issue of migratory sex work is more complex. In western culture, the dominant image of the victimized sex worker is of a "young, brown, Asian or Black woman" (Kempadoo, 2001b, p. 169). This illustration plays into the discourse by "othering women" to justify the current U.S. policy that objectifies women, by turning them into oppressed, dependent victims in need of rescue. A critical analysis of why this occurs is presented by Kempadoo (1998), who explains that the "bad girl" illustration "threatens male control and domination." This simultaneously distorts the real lived experiences of migrants (Long, 2004), assumes homogeneity and denies women their agency.

 The terminology being used shows a culturally imperialistic discourse on prostitution and trafficking. The speech delivered by U.S. President Bush in July of 2004 included this perpetuation of what Mohanty (1991, p. 57) calls "the construction of third world women as a homogenous powerless group often located as implicit victims of particular socio-economic systems." To a group of law enforcement officers and human services providers, President Bush declared, "The lives of tens of thousands of innocent women and children depend on your compassion, they depend on your determination, and they depend on your daily efforts to rescue them from misery and servitude. You are in a fight against evil, and the American people are grateful for your dedication and services." These women of the global South are also presented as victims of dire socio-economic conditions who need to be rescued by those of the global North. However, no responsibility is taken by the global North in the perpetuation of this poverty in third world countries through their imposed SAP and transnational corporations

bell hooks (2000) maintains that discounting women's agency and constructing non-western women as needing to be rescued perpetuates the idea of the weak "other" and the powerful westerner, further colonizing through the use of a hegemonic framework. Western NGOs construct the 'third world woman' as a 'damaged other' to justify their "own interventionist impulses" (Doezema, 2001, p. 1). Women are infantilized in the name of protecting and 'saving' them (Agustin, 2003b, p. 8), which takes away their power and agency. Also, requiring women to participate in a criminal justice model aimed at 'catching the bad guy' traffickers calls into question whether this policy is another way of regulating and possessing control over a woman's body through the withholding of services unless women can assist in the 'war against trafficking.'

The re-inscription of western imperialism and colonialism is evidenced through the creation and implementation of trafficking policies. A more inclusive and constructive discourse is one that takes into account the variety of conditions and agency of men and transgender individuals, as well the perspectives of sex workers who do not have rights as sex workers due to the illegal nature of their work. It is also crucial to hear the diverse experiences of migrants who are in a more threatened position due to their illegal status. The focus will have to shift away from associating trafficking primarily with sexual slavery and the sex industry. Agustin (2003b, p. 8) asserts, "when the subject is not a minority of women who are duped, sequestered and enslaved, we should be able to give credit where it is due to women and transsexuals, as well as men, who dare to make decisions to better their lives by leaving their homes to work abroad, no matter what kind of work they have to do."

The current U.S. government prefers repressive strategies because they are simple and in accordance with other agendas, such as immigration control, ending organized crime, imposing ideologies onto other countries, and maintaining women's morality and sexuality. By accepting the current abolitionist framework on trafficking, the multiple realities of migrants, sex workers and other groups are ignored, agency is denied, and all experiences are assumed to be the same. When western policy makers and feminists homogenize experiences and ignore contextual differences, this leads to a disregard of the historical, cultural and socio-political background of migrants..

**Vote neg to interrogate neoliberal economic engagement with latin America from the starting point of knowledge production.**

**Walsh, Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 2012**

(Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)

Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a central axis in the struggles and processes of social change in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with Latin American reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of

#### Root cause of global environmental degradation is neoliberal drive for profit-try or die for reorganizing social relations

**Abramsky, former Institute of Advanced Studies in Science, Technology and Society fellow, 2010**

(Kolya, Sparking a Worldwide Energy Revolution: Social Struggles in the Transition to a Post-Petrol World, pg 7-9)

The stark reality is that the only two recent periods that have seen a major reduction in global CO2emissions both occurred in periods of very sudden, rapid, socially disruptive, and painful periods of forced economic degrowth—namely the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the current financial-economic crisis. Strikingly, in May 2009, the International Energy Agency reported that, for the first time since 1945, global demand for electricity was expected to fall. Experience has shown that a lot of time and political energy have been virtually wasted on developing a highly-ineffective regulatory framework to tackle climate change. Years of COPs and MOPs—the international basis for regulatory efforts— have simply proven to be hot air. And, not surprisingly, hot air has resulted in global warming. Only unintended degrowth has had the effect that years of intentional regulations sought to achieve. Yet, the dominant approaches to climate change continue to focus on promoting regulatory reforms, rather than on more fundamental changes in social relations. This is true for governments, multilateral institutions, and also large sectors of so-called "civil society," especially the major national and international trade unions and their federations, and NGOs. And despite the patent inadequacy of this approach, regulatory efforts will certainly continue to be pursued. Furthermore, they may well contribute to shoring up legitimacy, at least in the short term, and in certain predominantly-northern countries where the effects of climate changes are less immediately visible and impact on people's lives less directly. Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that solutions will not be found at this level. The problem has to do with production, not regulation. The current worldwide system of production is based on endless growth and expansion, which is simply incompatible with a long term reduction in emissions and energy consumption. Despite the fact that localized and punctual moments of reduction may well still occur, the overall energy consumption and emissions of the system as a whole can only increase. All the energy-efficient technologies in the world, though undoubtedly crucial to any long term solution, cannot, on their own, square the circle by reducing the total emissions of a system whose survival is based on continual expansion. This is not to say that developing appropriate regulation is not important—it is completely essential. However, the regulatory process is very unlikely to be the driving force behind the changes, but rather a necessary facilitation process that enables wider changes. Furthermore, regulation that is strong enough to be effective is only likely to come about once wider changes in production are already underway. Energy generation and distribution plays a key role in shaping human relations. Every form of energy implies a particular organization of work and division of labor (both in general, and within the energy sector, in particular). The most significant social, economic, cultural, political, and technological transformations in history were associated with shifts in energy generation: from hunting and gathering to agriculture, from human and animal power for transport and production to wind and the steam engine, from coal to oil and nuclear fission as drivers of industry and war. All these transformations have led to increased concentration of power and wealth. And a very real possibility exists that the coming transformation in the world's energy system will result in similar shifts in power relations. But we live in interesting times. The ecological and social carrying-capacity of our planet and existing social relations are overstretched, snapping in different places. This will trigger a major change in the next few decades, but nobody knows in which direction. Consequently, the most important single factor determining the outcome of this change will be the intensity, sophistication, and creativity of grassroots social mobilization.

### Case 1

Anti-trafficking efforts do more harm than good-allows repressive measures against sex workers by the state

Doezema, PhD from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, 2 [Jo, “An Interview with Jo Doezema of the Network of Sex Work Projects: Does attention to trafficking adversely affect sex workers’ rights?”, Interview conducted by Elaine Murphy and Karin Ringheim, http://www.path.org/files/RHR-Article-2.pdf]

Question #2: Recently you published an article entitled, “Forced to Choose: Beyond the Voluntary-versus-Forced Prostitution Dichotomy, “ (in Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance and Redefinition, Routledge, 1998). If we under- Reproductive Health and Rights—Reaching the Hardly Reached 13 One might think that there would be no objections to reaching out to help trafficked persons. However, as this interview with Jo Doezema of the Network of Sex Work Projects reveals, even well-intended efforts to help one group can sometimes cause harm to another group. In this case, attempts to rescue trafficked girls from brothels can trample on the rights of voluntary sex workers. In addition, some groups inappropriately label all sex workers as trafficked persons, believing mistakenly that no one would willingly enter or stay in this occupation. stand your position correctly, you and NSWP are concerned that directing attention to the trafficking issue will detract from the broader agenda of the sex worker rights movement. Can you elaborate on the reasons for this concern and, if possible, give an example to illustrate your concern? One reason for our concern is the fact that most campaigns against trafficking focus exclusively on human rights violations committed by “pimps” or traffickers against “innocent women,” who are often understood to be non-sex workers. By contrast, sex worker organizations the world over identify the state, particularly the police, as the prime violators of sex workers’ rights. The result of shifting the locus of concern from state repression of sex workers to the individual acts of violent traffickers (reprehensible as these are) is that antitrafficking campaigns often lack a critical attitude towards the state. Ironically, the lack of recognition of state repression of sex workers means that measures to combat trafficking often strengthen the hand of the state at the expense of sex workers. Historically, efforts to combat trafficking (earlier called “white slavery”) have ended up justifying repressive measures against prostitutes themselves. Efforts to combat trafficking thus often combine measures to punish traffickers with those to prevent women from entering or staying in the sex industry voluntarily.

Aff can’t solve trafficking – fear of public authority

Giampolo, J.D. Candidate @ Temple Law School, 6 [Angela, “The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005: The Latest Weapon in the Fight Against Human Trafficking,” 16 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 195, Lexis]

Moreover, the greatest challenge for the immediate future is locating and identifying foreign victims. n145 From the inception of the TVPA to February 2005, HHS has issued only a total of 616 visas to human trafficking survivors, and another 573 T-visas to members of their family. n146 Sadly, victims have little trust in law enforcement agencies in the United States because in several countries of origin, law enforcement officials are corrupt and often actively collude with traffickers. n147

Multiple reasons T-visas aren’t used that the plan doesn’t overcome

Shinkle, Research Associate at the Institute for the Study of International Migration @ Walsh School of Foreign Service @ Georgetown, 7 [Whitney, “Protecting Trafficking Victims: Inadequate Measures”, August, pg. google]

In addition, to achieve either continued presence or T-Visa status, victims need to obtain a letter from a law enforcement official stating that they are a potential witness to human trafficking, or that they are complying with all “reasonable requests for assistance” from US law enforcement. For some survivors, however – particularly highly traumatized victims – the process of cooperating may be beyond their capacity. In addition, the application process to obtain a T-Visa and its accompanying protections is complicated and inaccessible to victims who do not speak English, are not familiar with the US legal system, have little or no income of their own, and are not guaranteed legal counsel. While victims are guaranteed the right to counsel, such counsel is not automatically provided on the victims’ behalf, and they may not seek the available benefits without the aid of government, nongovernmental, or non-profit advocates. The U-Visa, on the other hand, is not even available yet as government regulations regarding its application have still not been finalized.

No solvency-lack of training at the local and state levels

Reigel, J.D., Cornell Law School, 6 [April, “Missing the Mark: Why the Trafficking Victims Protection Act Fails to Protect Sex Trafficking Victims in the United States”, <http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/jlg/vol301/rieger.pdf>]

In order for the TVPA to aid trafficking victims, these women must be located and recognized as trafficking victims. There is a “grave problem of definition” of a “very practical” nature, which involves interpretation by people on the ground who qualifies as a sex trafficking victim. The government itself agrees that “the greatest challenge,” in terms of aiding sex trafficking victims, is “locating and identifying victims.” Sex trafficking victims are already at an enormous disadvantage when they encounter law enforcement and other officials. Because they live and work at the margins of society, they are easily and quickly labeled illegal immigrants and prostitutes. It is essential that these officials receive the proper training to be able seek out trafficking victims by proper investigation and identification of these women as victims rather than criminals. The TVPA provides funding for training programs, but it is underutilized.

That is not to say there is no training on the federal level. The Department of State recognizes that it “need[s] to do more to bring forward victims” and therefore it participates periodically in interagency training programs with the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) National Advocacy Center where T Visas are processed, with the USCIS, the Department of Labor (“DOL”), the FBI, federal prosecutors, and non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) Similarly, the DOJ launched a federal training program to help its investigators working with the FBI, USCIS, and DOL detect forced labor operations, including sex trafficking. There are few, if any comparable training programs for officials at the state and local levels. This is highly problematic because local police officers are frequently the first to come into contact with trafficking victims. If the officers cannot identify them as victims, these women are typically detained and deported. The sheer numbers of police departments in the United States-over 17,000-would make such a training task daunting, but a targeted approach aimed at training local law enforcement officials in geographic areas with the greatest incidence of sex trafficking could be more effective. Even simple procedures such as those provided in the “Look Beneath the Surface” screening guide described in the 2005 State Department Trafficking in Persons Report could be employed at local agencies that may come into contact with trafficking victims. The guide includes simple and pointed questions such as, “Has your identification or documentation been taken from you?” that can uncover circumstances and lead to discovery of more trafficking victims.

No solvency-basic needs are not met

Reigel, J.D., Cornell Law School, 6 [April, “Missing the Mark: Why the Trafficking Victims Protection Act Fails to Protect Sex Trafficking Victims in the United States”, <http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/jlg/vol301/rieger.pdf>]

Once a trafficking victim has freed herself from her traffickers, she must begin to rebuild her life, whether in the United States or abroad. Most victims have few resources with which to do this. The fortunate few who qualify for TVPA benefits and services will have their most basic needs temporarily met, including food, shelter, and financial assistance. However, many of these benefits are only temporary, and as discussed, many women will not qualify for these benefits. The legal focus on sex trafficking has been on criminal prosecutions rather than on civil remedies. Although restitution is available in some criminal prosecution of traffickers, restitution awards do not allow recovery for physical or emotional damages. Because of the nature of sex trafficking, these are precisely the categories of damages that trafficking victims suffer most.

No solvency – U.S. interventionism will recreate the problem

Melzer, writer for In These Times, 5 [Eartha, 3/14, http://www.religiousconsultation.org/News\_Tracker/trafficking\_in\_politics.htm]

Even worse, U.S. interventions around the world are contributing to the trafficking and exploitation of women. The State Department TIP report for 2003 noted that trafficking activities have increased in Afghanistan and Iraq as a consequence of instability brought on by armed conflict. "As we have seen elsewhere," the report stated, "the demand for prostitution often increases with the presence of military troops, expatriates and international personnel who have access to disposable income." On April 24, 2002, Ben Johnston, a helicopter mechanic for DynCorp in Bosnia, testified to Congress about DynCorp employees who were allegedly buying women and girls to keep in their homes as sex slaves. Yet, despite the president's "zero tolerance" directive and the development of laws that would hold contractors responsible for involvement in sex trafficking, DynCorp remains in good standing as a U.S. contractor, and in 2003 was awarded a no-bid contract to "re-establish police, justice and prison functions in post-conflict Iraq." In 2002, media reports detailed how "courtesy patrol" units around U.S. bases in Korea were directing soldiers and tourists to locations where they could engage the services of sex workers, mainly women from Russia and the Philippines who were held captive and forced to with soldiers. South Korean authorities estimated that their country's sex industry was worth $ 22 billion a year and involved 330,000 women.

Prefer our ev-Their stats are bunk

Doezema, PhD from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, 99 [Jo, “Loose Women or Lost Women? The re-emergence of the myth of ‘white slavery’ in contemporary discourses of ‘trafficking in women’”, http://www.walnet.org/csis/papers/doezema-loose.html]

It is not my intent, I wish to emphasise, to indicate that all accounts of trafficking, including those referred to in this paper, are 'false' by calling 'trafficking in women' a myth. Women who travel for work in the sex industry are often lied to about the conditions they will work under, and in a number of cases are subjected to violence and/or find themselves working in slavery-like conditions. Some women are also lied to about the type of work they will be doing (GSN 1997, Weijers and Lap-Chew 1997). The repetition of the discursive foundations of 'white slavery' do, however, lead to the question of the extent to which the campaign against 'trafficking in women' revolves, like that on white slavery, around a relatively few number of cases that conform to the stereotype of the innocent girl lured or abducted into the sex industry. A systematic investigation of reports and statistics of 'trafficking in women', similar to those undertaken by chroniclers of the white slavery panic, has yet to be done. However, there are reasons to question the reliability of evidence of 'trafficking in women'. Firstly, evidence of 'trafficking' is often based on unrevealed or unverifiable sources. The Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women (GAATW), who undertook a year-and-a-half-long investigation into 'trafficking in women' internationally at the request of the UN Special Rapporteur On Violence Against Women, stated that finding reliable statistics on the extent of trafficking in women was virtually impossible, due to a lack of systematic research, the lack of a 'precise, consistent and unambiguous definition of the phenomena [of trafficking in women]' and the illegality or criminal nature of prostitution and 'trafficking' (Weijers and Lap-Chew 1997: 15). However, this does not stop 'experts' and journalists from quoting huge numbers. For example, a recent working paper prepared for the UN Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery quotes an estimate of one to two million women and children trafficked each year, but the figure is not referenced, nor is any research cited (IMADR 1998:1). Secondly, as the writers of the GAATW report note, when statistics are available, they usually refer to the number of migrant or domestic sex workers, rather than cases of 'trafficking' (Weijers and Lap-Chew 1997: 15). Statistics on 'white slavery' to Buenos Aires were based on the numbers and nationalities of registered prostitutes (Guy 1991: 7). In a striking parallel, a Global Survival Network (GSN) report (1997) uses the rise in numbers of Russian, Eastern European and NIS women in the sex industry in western Europe and the US as evidence of 'trafficking' (p. 5,7). But even these figures are not to be trusted: Kempadoo notes the extreme variations in estimates of numbers of prostitutes in Asia -- estimates for the city of Bombay alone range from 100,000 to 600,000 (1998a: 15). As she remarks: To any conscientious social scientist, such discrepancies should be cause for extreme suspicion of the reliability of the research, yet when it comes to sex work and prostitution, few eyebrows are raised and the figures are easily bandied about without question (1998a: 15).

The aff is part of a human rights framework that otherizes and enforces Western imperialism-Construction of the traffickers as savage, the trafficked as victims, and the U.S. as the savior all prove the link

Mutua, Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, 1 [Makau, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights”, *Harvard International Law Journal*, Winter]

The human rights movement is marked by a damning metaphor. The grand narrative of human rights contains a subtext that depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, on the one hand, against victims and saviors, on the other. The savages-victims-saviors (SVS) construction is a three-dimensional compound metaphor in which each dimension is a metaphor in itself. The main authors of the human rights discourse, including the United Nations, Western states, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and senior Western academics, constructed this three-dimensional prism. This rendering of the human rights corpus and its discourse is unidirectional and predictable, a black-and-white construction that pits good against evil.

This Article attempts to elicit from the proponents of the human rights movement several admissions, some of them deeply unsettling. It asks that human rights advocates be more self-critical and come to terms with the troubling rhetoric and history that shape, in part, the human rights movement. At the same time, the Article does not only address the biased and arrogant rhetoric and history of the human rights enterprise, but also grapples with the contradictions in the basic nobility and majesty that drive the human rights project--the drive from the unflinching belief that human beings and the political societies they construct can be governed by a higher morality. This first section briefly introduces the three dimensions of the SVS metaphor and how the metaphor exposes the theoretical flaws of the current human rights corpus.

The first dimension of the prism depicts a savage and evokes images of barbarism. The abominations of the savage are presented as so cruel and unimaginable as to represent their state as a negation of humanity. The human rights story presents the state as the classic savage, an ogre forever bent on the consumption of humans. Although savagery in human rights discourse connotes much more than the state, the state is depicted as the operational instrument of savagery. States become savage when they choke off and oust civil society. The "good" state controls its demonic proclivities by cleansing itself with, and internalizing, human rights. The "evil" state, on the other hand, expresses itself through an illiberal, anti-democratic, or other authoritarian culture. The redemption or salvation of the state is solely dependent on its submission to human rights norms. The state is the guarantor of human rights; it is also the target and raison d'etre of human rights law.

But the reality is far more complex. While the metaphor may suggest otherwise, it is not the state per se that is barbaric but the cultural foundation of the state. The state only becomes a vampire when "bad" culture overcomes or disallows the development of "good" culture. The real savage, though, is not the state but a cultural deviation from human rights. That savagery inheres in the theory and practice of the one-party state, military junta, controlled or closed state, theocracy, or even cultural practices such as the one popularly known in the West as female genital mutilation (FGM), not in the state per se. The state itself is a neutral, passive instrumentality--a receptacle or an empty vessel--that conveys savagery by implementing the project of the savage culture.

The second dimension of the prism depicts the face and the fact of a victim as well as the essence and the idea of victimhood. A human being whose "dignity and worth" have been violated by the savage is the victim. The victim figure is a powerless, helpless innocent whose naturalist attributes have been negated by the primitive and offensive actions of the state or the cultural foundation of the state. The entire human rights structure is both anticatastrophic and reconstructive. It is anti-catastrophic because it is designed to prevent more calamities through the creation of more victims. It is reconstructive because it seeks to re-engineer the state and the society to reduce the number of victims, as it defines them, and prevent conditions that give rise to victims. The classic human rights document--the human rights report--embodies these two mutually reinforcing strategies. An INGO human rights report is usually a catalogue of horrible catastrophes visited on individuals. As a rule, each report also carries a diagnostic epilogue and recommended therapies and remedies.

The third dimension of the prism is the savior or the redeemer, the good angel who protects, vindicates, civilizes, restrains, and safeguards. The savior is the victim's bulwark against tyranny. The simple, yet complex promise of the savior is freedom: freedom from the tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture. But it is also the freedom to create a better society based on particular values. In the human rights story, the savior is the human rights corpus itself, with the United Nations, Western governments, INGOs, and Western charities as the actual rescuers, redeemers of a benighted world. In reality, however, these institutions are merely fronts. The savior is ultimately a set of culturally based norms and practices that inhere in liberal thought and philosophy.

Several impacts-A) Reinforces colonialism through using a Western framework B)Ultimate otherization through creation of inferior subjects and C)Turns the case because removes legitimacy and spillover of effective human rights policy

Mutua, Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, 1 [Makau, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights”, *Harvard International Law Journal*, Winter]

The human rights corpus, though well-meaning, is fundamentally Eurocentric, and suffers from several basic and interdependent flaws captured in the SVS metaphor. First, the corpus falls within the historical continuum of the Eurocentric colonial project, in which actors are cast into superior and subordinate positions. Precisely because of this cultural and historical context, the human rights movement's basic claim of universality is undermined. Instead, a historical understanding of the struggle for human dignity should locate the impetus of a universal conception of human rights in those societies subjected to European tyranny and imperialism. Unfortunately, this is not part of the official human rights narrative. Some of the most important events preceding the post-1945, United Nations-led human rights movement include the anti-slavery campaigns in both Africa and the United States, the anti-colonial struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and the struggles for women's suffrage and equal rights throughout the world. But the pioneering work of many non-Western activists and other human rights heroes are not acknowledged by the contemporary human rights movement. These historically important struggles, together with the norms anchored in non-Western cultures and societies, have either been overlooked or rejected in the construction of the current understanding of human rights.

Second, the SVS metaphor and narrative rejects the cross-contamination of cultures and instead promotes a Eurocentric ideal. The metaphor is premised on the transformation by Western cultures of non-Western cultures into a Eurocentric prototype and not the fashioning of a multicultural mosaic. The SVS metaphor results in an "othering" process that imagines the creation of inferior clones, in effect dumb copies of the original. For example, Western political democracy is in effect an organic element of human rights. "Savage" cultures and peoples are seen as lying outside the human rights orbit, and by implication, outside the regime of political democracy. It is this distance from human rights that allows certain cultures to create victims. Political democracy is then viewed as a panacea. Other textual examples anchored in the treatment of cultural phenomena, such as "traditional" practices that appear to negate the equal protection for women, also illustrate the gulf between human rights and non-liberal, non-European cultures.

 [\*206] Third, the language and rhetoric of the human rights corpus present significant theoretical problems. The arrogant and biased rhetoric of the human rights movement prevents the movement from gaining cross-cultural legitimacy. This curse of the SVS rhetoric has no bearing on the substance of the normative judgment being rendered. A particular leader, for example, could be labeled a war criminal, but such a label may carry no validity locally because of the curse of the SVS rhetoric. In other words, the SVS rhetoric may undermine the universalist warrant that it claims and thus engender resistance to the apprehension and punishment of real violators.

#### Weigh consequences—moral absolutism *reproduces evil*.

Isaac 2 — Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University-Bloomington, 2002 (“Ends, Means, and Politics,” *Dissent*, Volume 49, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost, p. 35-36)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. [end page 35] This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Voting aff doesn’t necessitate absolute utilitarianism – there is a high threshold past which we should compromise morals to avoid catastrophic consequences

Moore – law prof, U San Diego – ‘97

Michael Moore, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law, 1997, Placing Blame, p. 719-722

Non-Absolute Moral Norms: Threshold Deontology Apart from the exceptions that the content of moral norms must have for them to be plausible, a third modification of absolutism is the softening of the ‘whatever the consequences’ aspect mentioned earlier. This aspect of absolutism is often attributed to Kant, who held that though the heavens may fall, justice must be done. Despite my non­consequentialist views on morality, I cannot accept the Kantian line. It just is not true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It is not even true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or torture an innocent person. To prevent such extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be justified. There is a story in the Talmudic sources that may appear to appeal to a contrary intuition.122 It is said that where the city is sur­rounded and threatened with destruction if it does not send out one of its inhabitants to be killed, it is better that the whole city should perish rather than become an accomplice to the killing of one of its inhabitants. Benjamin Cardozo expressed the same intuition in rejecting the idea that those in a lifeboat about to sink and drown may jettison enough of their number to allow the remainder to stay afloat. As Cardozo put it: Where two or more are overtaken by a common disaster, there is no right on the part of one to save the lives of some by the killing of another. There is no rule of human jettison. Men there will often be who, when told that their going will be the salvation of the remnant, will choose the nobler part and make the plunge into the waters. In that supreme moment the dark­ness for them will be illumined by the thought that those behind will ride to safety. If none of such mold are found aboard the boat, or too few to save the others, the human freight must be left to meet the chances of the waters. 123 There is admittedly a nobility when those who are threatened with destruction choose on their own to suffer that destruction rather than participate in a prima facie immoral act. But what happens when we eliminate the choice of all concerned to sacrifice them­selves? Alter the Talmudic example slightly by making it the ruler of the city who alone must decide whether to send one out in order to prevent destruction of the city. Or take the actual facts of the lifeboat case’24 to which Cardozo was adverting, where it was a sea­man who took charge of the sinking lifeboat and jettisoned enough of its passengers to save the rest. Or consider Bernard Williams’s example, where you come across a large group of villagers about to be shot by the army as an example to others, and you can save most of them if you will but shoot one; far from choosing to ‘sink or swim’ together, the villagers beg you to shoot one of their number so that the rest may be saved.125 In all such cases it no longer seems virtuous to refuse to do an act that you abhor. On the contrary, it seems a narcissistic preoccupation with your own ‘virtue’—that is, the ‘virtue’ you could have if the world were ideal and did not pre­sent you with such awful choices—if you choose to allow the greater number to perish. In such cases, I prefer Sartre’s version of the Orestes legend to the Talmud: the ruler should take the guilt upon himself rather than allow his people to perish.’26One should feel guilty **in such cases,** but it is nobler to undertake such guilt than to shut one’s eyes to the horrendous consequences of not acting. I thus have some sympathy for the Landau Commission’s conclusion that ‘actual torture . . . would perhaps be justified in order to uncover a bomb about to explode in a building full of people’. If one does not know which building is going to explode, one does not have the consent of all concerned to ‘sink or swim’ together. On the contrary, one suspects that like Williams’s villagers, the occupants of the building, if they knew of their danger, would choose that one of their number (to say nothing of one of the ter­rorist group) be tortured or die to prevent the loss of all. In any case, the GSS interrogator must choose for others who will pay the costs for his decision if he decides not to act, a cost he does not have to bear; this situation is thus more like my variation of the Talmudic example than the original. Many think that the agent-relative view just sketched, allowing as it does consequences to override moral absolutes when those consequences are horrendous enough, collapses into a consequen­tialist morality after all. Glanville Williams, for example, in his discussion of the legal defence of necessity, recognizes the agent-relative view that ‘certain actions are right or wrong irrespective of their consequences’ and that ‘a good end never justifies bad means’. Williams nonetheless concludes that ‘in the last resort moral decisions must be made with reference to results’. Williams reaches this conclusion because, as Williams sees it, the agent-relative slogans just quoted reduce to the claim ‘that we ought to do what is right regardless of the consequences, as long as the consequences are not serious’. Contrary to Williams, there is no collapse of agent-relative views into consequentialism just because morality’s norms can be over­ridden by horrendous consequences.13’ A consequentialist is com­mitted by her moral theory to saying that torture of one person is justified whenever it is necessary to prevent the torture of two or more. The agent-relative view, even as here modified, is not com­mitted to this proposition. To justify torturing one innocent person requires that there be horrendous consequences attached to not tor­turing that person—the destruction of an entire city, or, perhaps, of a lifeboat or building full of people. On this view, in other words, there is a very high threshold of bad consequences that must be threatened before something as awful as torturing an innocent per­son can be justified. Almost all real-life decisions a GSS interroga­tor will face—and perhaps all decisions—will not reach that threshold of horrendous consequences justifying torture of the innocent. Short of such a threshold, the agent-relative view just sketched will operate as absolutely as absolutism in its ban on tor­turing the innocent.

#### All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved

**Cummisky, 96** (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontologieal constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that 1 may still saw two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hills example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one. Then 1 cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But Similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up. How is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the lass of the one, each is priceless: thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing'letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.\*

#### Util accommodates rights

Shaw, 99 – Professor of Philosophy @ San Jose State

(William H, Contemporary Ethics, p.185-186)

One of the most widespread criticisms of utilitarianism is that it cannot take rights seriously enough. Generally speaking, rights take precedence over considerations of immediate utility. They limit or restrict direct appeals to welfare maximization. For example, to have a right to free speech means that one is free to speak one's mind even if doing so will fail to maximize happiness because others will dislike hearing what one has to say. The right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself entails that it would be wrong to force a criminal defendant to testify against himself even if the results of doing so would be good. If rights are moral claims that trump straightforward appeals to utility," then utilitarianism, the critics argue, cannot meaningfully respect rights because their theory subordinates them to the promotion of welfare. However, the criticism that utilitarianism cannot do right by rights ignores the extent to which utilitarianism can, as discussed in Chapter 5, accommodate the moral rules, principles, and norms other than welfare maximization that appear to constitute the warp and woof of our moral lives. To be sure, utilitarians look at rights in a different light than do . moral theorists who see them as self-evident or as having an independent deontic status grounded on non-utilitarian considerations. For utilitarians, it is not rights, but the promotion of welfare, that lies at the heart of morality. Bentham was consistently hostile to the idea of natural rights, in large measure because he believed that invoking natural rights was only a way of dressing up appeals to intuition in fancy rhetoric. In a similar vein, many utilitarians today believe that in both popular and philosophical discourse people are too quick to declare themselves possessors of all sorts of putative rights and that all too frequently these competing claims of rights only obscure the important, underlying moral issues.

#### And there’s no link to the citizen, non-citizen distinction – that’s a product of flawed ethics

Dworkin, 77 – Professor of Philosophy @ NYU (Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 274-275)

Utilitarian arguments of policy, however, would seem secure from that objection. They do not suppose that any form of life is inherently more valuable than any other, but instead base their claim, that constraints on liberty are necessary to advance some collective goal of the community, just on the fact that that goal happens to be desired more widely or more deeply than any other. Utilitarian arguments of policy, therefore, seem not to oppose but on the contrary to embody the fundamental right of equal concern and respect, because they treat the wishes of each member of the community on a par with the wishes of any other, with no bonus or discount reflecting the view that the member is more or less worthy of concern, or his views more or less worthy of respect, than any other.

### Case 2

**Risk management is good---the inherent unpredictability of social events is all the more reason for creating optimal resiliency through scenario planning**

**Cochrane 11** John H. Cochrane is a **Prof**essor of finance **at** the **U**niversity of **Chicago** Booth School of Business and a contributor to Business Class "IN DEFENSE OF THE HEDGEHOGS" July 15 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/15/john-h-cochrane/in-defense-of-the-hedgehogs/

Risk Management Rather than Forecast-and-Plan

**The answer is to change the question**, to **focus on risk management**, **as Gardner and Tetlock suggest**. **There is a set of events that could happen tomorrow**—Chicago could have an earthquake, there could be a run on Greek debt, the Administration could decide “Heavens, Dodd–Frank and Obamacare were huge mistakes, let’s fix them” (Okay, not the last one.) **Attached to each event, there is some probability that it could happen.**

**Now “forecasting”** as Gardner and Tetlock characterize it, **is an attempt to figure out which event really will happen**, whether the coin will land on heads or tails, **and then make a plan based on that knowledge. It’s a fool’s game**.

**Once we recognize that uncertainty will always remain**, **risk management rather than forecasting is much wiser**. **Just the step of naming the events that could happen is useful**. **Then, ask yourself, “if this event happens, let’s make sure we have a contingency plan so we’re not really screwed**.” Suppose you’re counting on diesel generators to keep cooling water flowing through a reactor. What if someone forgets to fill the tank?

**The good use of “forecasting” is to get a better handle on probabilities**, so we focus our risk management resources on the most important events. But **we must still pay attention to events**, **and buy insurance against them**, **based as much on the painfulness of the event as on its probability.** (Note to economics techies: what matters is the risk-neutral probability, probability weighted by marginal utility.) **So it’s not really the forecast that’s wrong, it’s what people do with it. If we all understood the essential unpredictability of the world**, especially of rare and very costly events, if we got rid of the habit of mind that asks for a forecast and then makes “plans” as if that were the only state of the world that could occur; **if we instead focused on laying out all the bad things that could happen and made sure we had insurance or contingency plans, both personal and public policies might be a lot better**.

#### Prolif key to international stability

Waltz 12 – Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., Foreign Affairs. Why Iran Should get the Bomb Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability.http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-br/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf)

The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current course and publicly goes¶ nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing¶ that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such language is typical of¶ major powers, which have historically gotten riled up whenever another country has begun to develop a¶ nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less. Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear¶ state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken¶ so long for a potential balancer to emerge.¶ Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and¶ why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to¶ its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran.¶ But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored.¶ UNFOUNDED FEARS¶ One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it¶ has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally¶ behave in the international system. The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that¶ the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is¶ made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other¶ leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume otherwise.¶ Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as¶ irrational has allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear. Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions,¶ but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move. Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still¶ worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act¶ more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism.

#### Iran prolif key to solve Iran-Israel conflict- goes nuclear

Waltz 12 – Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., Foreign Affairs. Why Iran Should get the Bomb Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability.http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-br/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf)

But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so¶ far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now. Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now. REST ASSURED¶ In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the¶ instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have.¶ There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally¶ dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because¶ open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran.¶ But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little¶ purpose.¶ Most important, policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should¶ take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.

#### No offensive capabilities from nuclear supremacy- everyone proves- Iran wants the nuke to secure its existence

Perkovich et al. 12 – vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

(George, Brian Radzinsky and Jaclyn Tandler are junior fellows at the Nuclear Policy Program. The Iranian Nuclear Challenge and the GCC. Published May 2012. [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/31/iranian-nuclear-challenge-and-gcc/b67p#](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/31/iranian-nuclear-challenge-and-gcc/b67p))

Dealing with a Nuclear-Armed Iran The possibilities discussed above are more optimistic than many analyses of the implications of military strikes on Iran. If Iran’s violent reactions to being struck – terrorism, retaliatory missile strikes, etc. – were not well contained the effect on Gulf states could be much worse. This invites the question considered below: whether the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran would be so grave as to warrant the risks of war. Few, if any, knowledgeable observers think that if Iran possessed nuclear weapons it would use them in offensive attacks against its Arab neighbors (or, for that matter, Israel or the United States). Conducting offensive war with nuclear weapons would merely invite retaliation that would destroy the Iranian regime, if not much of Iranian society. There is nothing in the history of the Islamic Republic that suggests its leaders would act so self-destructively. The main value of nuclear weapons to the Iranian government would be to bolster its confidence that the U.S. and other states would not forcibly seek to overthrow it. Historically, states that possess nuclear weapons have not found these weapons to be very effective in coercing other states to do what they want, or to spare them from defeat in wars outside their territories. For example, the U.S. was defeated in Vietnam and the Soviet Union was defeated in Afghanistan, despite their enormous nuclear arsenals. The U.S. nuclear monopoly has not enabled it to achieve its political objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan, or in Iran for that matter. Nor did Israel’s nuclear arms prevent Egypt from initiating the 1973 war or Hezbollah from conducting the 2006 war. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons did not enable it to avoid defeat in the 1999 Kargil war with India, though they probably helped deter India from escalating that war into Pakistani territory. These as well as other cases indicate that the only clear utility of nuclear weapons is to deter states from invading your territory. An Iran that is more confident that others would not invade it does not pose an additional threat to other Gulf states. The GCC states may wish for a different regime in Iran, and in this sense could prefer that Iran not become more secure against invasion. But this does not mean that an Iran with a nuclear deterrent would pose existential threats to them. Indeed, the Gulf monarchies could be more threatened if democratization took hold in Iran (with or without nuclear weapons) and further undermined the legitimacy of the monarchs and sheikhs. The biggest threats of a nuclear-armed Iran are not physical or matters of life or death on a large scale. Rather, the main injuries a nuclear-armed Iran would cause are to the pride and political self-confidence of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Turkey. Iran – Persia – would lord its nuclear status over its Arab neighbors and Turkey. Iranian leaders would exploit the perception that nuclear weapons are a major technical achievement and bestow regional hegemonic political power to win domestic support and to humiliate Sunni Arab neighbors. This would be profoundly upsetting to Arab monarchs in particular.

**Risk management is good---the inherent unpredictability of social events is all the more reason for creating optimal resiliency through scenario planning**

**Cochrane 11** John H. Cochrane is a **Prof**essor of finance **at** the **U**niversity of **Chicago** Booth School of Business and a contributor to Business Class "IN DEFENSE OF THE HEDGEHOGS" July 15 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/15/john-h-cochrane/in-defense-of-the-hedgehogs/

Risk Management Rather than Forecast-and-Plan

**The answer is to change the question**, to **focus on risk management**, **as Gardner and Tetlock suggest**. **There is a set of events that could happen tomorrow**—Chicago could have an earthquake, there could be a run on Greek debt, the Administration could decide “Heavens, Dodd–Frank and Obamacare were huge mistakes, let’s fix them” (Okay, not the last one.) **Attached to each event, there is some probability that it could happen.**

**Now “forecasting”** as Gardner and Tetlock characterize it, **is an attempt to figure out which event really will happen**, whether the coin will land on heads or tails, **and then make a plan based on that knowledge. It’s a fool’s game**.

**Once we recognize that uncertainty will always remain**, **risk management rather than forecasting is much wiser**. **Just the step of naming the events that could happen is useful**. **Then, ask yourself, “if this event happens, let’s make sure we have a contingency plan so we’re not really screwed**.” Suppose you’re counting on diesel generators to keep cooling water flowing through a reactor. What if someone forgets to fill the tank?

**The good use of “forecasting” is to get a better handle on probabilities**, so we focus our risk management resources on the most important events. But **we must still pay attention to events**, **and buy insurance against them**, **based as much on the painfulness of the event as on its probability.** (Note to economics techies: what matters is the risk-neutral probability, probability weighted by marginal utility.) **So it’s not really the forecast that’s wrong, it’s what people do with it. If we all understood the essential unpredictability of the world**, especially of rare and very costly events, if we got rid of the habit of mind that asks for a forecast and then makes “plans” as if that were the only state of the world that could occur; **if we instead focused on laying out all the bad things that could happen and made sure we had insurance or contingency plans, both personal and public policies might be a lot better**.

# 2nc

## 2nc – PIC

### A2: Solvency Deficit

#### 4.CP solves better-it includes a new class of victims

Kloer, full-time abolitionist, 9 [Amanda, “Why ‘Human Trafficking’ Sucks as a Term”, http://humantrafficking.change.org/blog/view/why\_human\_trafficking\_sucks\_as\_a\_term]

Do you ever wonder why it's sometimes difficult to get what human trafficking is really about? It's confusing, in part, because the phrase "human trafficking" kind of sucks at portraying the heart of the issue. Robin Sax has got a great article over at HuffPo on this, but here's my take.

The problem I have with "human trafficking" is the "trafficking" part of the term. "Trafficking" has a number of definitions, but most of them have to do with movement or trade of goods. In fact, before "human trafficking" became a term and a crime, many people understood trafficking in the context of moving drugs or weapons across international boarders. So in hearing the phrase "human trafficking", they picture people being moved across international boarders.

But human trafficking is not a crime of movement, it is a crime of exploitation. According to the U.S. law, for example, human trafficking is defined as "recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining and person for labor or services through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage or slavery; sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age." Note that transportation is one action of many that can make someone a trafficker. For example, if John and Judy live next door to each other and John recruits Judy into prostitution at his house through force, fraud or coercion, then John has trafficked Judy, even though they've never left their street. On the flip side, if Stan drives men from Albania to Greece to work, he may be helping them illegally cross a border, but he is not trafficking them. However, if Stan drives men from Albania to Greece intending to subject them to debt bondage, he is trafficking them. It's not the transportation which matters, it's the exploitation.

The reason language is so important is that when we assume movement is the centerpiece of human trafficking, we miss out on helping huge populations of victims who are trafficked within their own countries, towns, and sometimes even within their own families. Their exploitation is just as real as the exploitation of victims who were moved overseas, but they may not be identified as trafficking victims based on an imperfect understanding of their situations.

Personally, I prefer the term "modern-day slavery" because I think it better describes the victims' experience and what the perpetrators do. On this blog, however, I use the two terms interchangeably, in part because many more people are familiar with the term "human trafficking" than the term "modern-day slavery". Even the phrase "modern-day slavery," though, can be problematic. Most people connect slavery with physical bondage. Victims of modern-day slavery are sometimes held in physical bondage, but are often held by emotional, financial, and psychological chains.

#### Abandoning the term “human trafficking” is critical to solvency-Only way to get public’s attention

Sax, Former Deputy District Attorney and Legal Commentator, 9 [Robin, “Human Trafficking: A Problem of Language”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robin-sax/human-trafficking-a-probl_b_264789.html>, 8/21]

Why is that human trafficking is so pervasive and yet so misunderstood? Why do we assume that it's really an "overseas" issue? Why do most people think of Cambodia or Thailand when the words "human trafficking" are uttered? It's not because it does not exist here in the United States--we know it does. As a matter of fact, the numbers are astounding: the sex trade is a multi-billion-dollar industry worldwide. UNICEF estimates that approximately 1 million children around the world unwillingly become sex slaves every year. The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that there are 200,000 U.S. citizens yearly, mainly children and young women, who are at high risk of being trafficked throughout the U.S for sexual purposes. The perception of human trafficking as an "overseas" issue has persisted even though the U.S. passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act in October, 2000 to criminalize the issue domestically. It was the first law specifically intended to prevent victimization, to protect victims, and to prosecute perpetrators of human trafficking here in the States. Added to society's lack of understanding the truly epidemic proportions of human trafficking is a similar lack from law enforcement and prosecutors. Even though we have federal human trafficking laws, many states do not have a version of these laws. Even worse, some prosecutors don't even know these laws exist! The effect of this lack of awareness is that many prosecutors will file charges only on the "sex act" aspect of this crime. They may omit the crime of human trafficking from the rap sheets, charging documents, and ultimately, from the view of our society.I am not alone in believing that much of our ignorance of human trafficking and the subsequent lack of prosecutions are because the terminology is vague and confusing. The very phrase, "human trafficking," is a poor description of what really happens. Human trafficking is not synonymous with moving people overseas. Instead, the U.S. Federal Act of 2000 defines it as the "recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining and person for labor or services through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage or slavery; sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age." With this definition we see two aspects of trafficking, both highly repugnant: trafficking involves commercial sexual exploitation of women and children (also known as "forced prostitution") AND it involves involuntary servitude (also known as "slavery"). Not surprisingly, most Americans cannot accept the idea that a form of slavery still exists within the United States! Shared Hope International, founded by former Congresswoman Linda Smith, is a nonprofit leading a worldwide effort to eradicate the marketplaces of sexual slavery. They have coined the term "Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking" (DMST) to refer to what is happening here in the United States. DMST is defined as "commercial sexual exploitation of American children within American borders." Wake up, folks! It's real, and it's really happening here! DMST is a term that more accurately describes the nature of the crime, as well as the victim status, by avoiding the vague term, "human trafficking" or the poorly received term, "child prostitution." The organization believes that the status of "victim" will be clarified, as opposed to looking at the child as the delinquent. Child prostitutes are frequently thought of as "bad kids" and therefore they often they do not get the specialized care that they need. In truth, these kids are a special group of sexual assault victims. They have not chosen this lifestyle, despite what the perception is. Unfortunately, the term "child prostitution" implies to some people that there is some complicity from the victim. Not true. Instead, more and more children are involved in sex trafficking because that the supply is becoming younger in response to buyers' demands. These perverts want to be with young people so they can be associated with their victims' youth, health, and vulnerability. It's the commercial aspect that separates the crime of trafficking from other sexual acts children, and it is this aspect where we need to see change. Frequently, law enforcers and prosecutors do not recognize the commercial aspect or are too lazy, understaffed or under-budgeted to investigate. Instead, they rationalize that just getting the "perp" in the process of committing the act is enough. However, they are failing to get to the real source of the traffickers, the pimps, etc. and are not fully utilizing the power of this law. Trafficking happens right here at home, not just in poor places by "pimps." Surprisingly, it often involves people you would never expect. For example, just last week, Ronald H. Tills, 74, a retired US State Supreme Court Justice, was sentenced to 18 months in prison on a felony charge of transporting prostitutes across state lines. In this case, Tills was trafficking a young illegal woman to serve as a prostitute at a convention he was attending. A human trafficking task force investigated the case. Its members included investigators from the FBI, U. S. Border Patrol, and U. S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, as well as the Erie and Niagara County sheriff's offices. But this never really made the news - few people heard about it. As I pondered the case, I couldn't help wondering why most of us hadn't heard about it. Perhaps there were other pressing news bits, but what is more pressing then protecting children and other victims of sexual assault? Is it more important to know whether Dr. Conrad Murray is going to be charged for manslaughter in Michael Jackson's death? Or is it more likely that human trafficking is a crime we simply don't understand--mostly because of a simple problem with semantics?

### AT Legality

#### Discursive PICs are key to education-CP solves linguistic vulnerability

Kehl, Prof @ English Department at ASU, and Livingston, Emeritus Professor of English @ Pace University, 99 [D.G. and Howard, June, “Doublespeak Detection for the English Classroom”, English Journal”]

Second, students’ own linguistic vulnerability should be demonstrated in a meaningful and convincing way. How would they react for example, if while shopping the encounter “vegetarian leather” for plain, cheap vinyl; or “synthetic glass” for plastic; or encounter “vegetarian leather” for plain, cheap vinyl; or “synthetic glass” for plastic; or, in place of down payment, they get “customer capital cost reduction”? Third, they should be made more sensitive to language and how it works, not just denotation but connotation, concrete versus abstract terms, specific versus general, adjectives as evaluative projections of a speaker or writer, slanted language, and much more. For example, they can be asked to consider how many times in a year they buy something simply on the persuasive appeal of words rather than on the genuine merits of the product, whether that product is sunglasses, clothes, vehicles, or food. Especially illuminating in developing sensitivity to language are exercises that ask students to distinguish differences in connotation among lists of so-called synonyms. For example, which of the following would they like to be called-and why: boy/girl, lad/lassie, kid, young person, youngster, tyke, juvenile, future citizen, Generation X-er, member of the rising generation? Lively discussions can be conducted on the connotative effects of the language of advertising. For example, why are certain words taboo in advertising, requiring the substitution of euphemisms: not “Fat” but “full figured,” not “cheap” but “inexpensive,” not “used car” but “preowned automobile,” not “smell” but “aroma.” (A recent example of doublespeak for “stink” is “exceed the olfactory threshold.”) Fourth, students should be taught not only to read critically, but also to speak and write responsibility. Wasn’t it Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch who noted that a writer should be prepared to stand cross-examination on every word? And as for reading critically, perhaps Thomas Carlyle said it best: “If we think of it, all that a university or final highest school can do for us is still but what the first school began doing-teach us to read.” Isn’t that at least a significant part of the English teacher’s job description? Finally, students should be taught how to “talk back” by disarming and defusing doublespeak through what Judith Butler calls “counter-appropriation” (or what Hugh Rank has called “intensifying” and “downplaying” in his Doublespeak Scheme). Recent communication theory offers further direction for discussing doublespeak in the classroom. For example, even a brilliant, well-organized, and illustrated lecture on language manipulation may have limited success (the doublespeaker would call it “counterproductive”) Like it or not, television and the media have a lot to teach us about communicating with young people.

#### And, this education should be privileged

Kehl, Prof @ English Department at ASU, and Livingston, Emeritus Professor of English @ Pace University, 99 [D.G. and Howard, June, “Doublespeak Detection for the English Classroom”, English Journal”]

The answer to that question underscores the crucial need for every English teacher-on every level, from the primary grades to graduate school, and in every field of the profession, from rhetoric and composition to linguistics, and all periods and genres of literature-to become an expert in teaching about linguistic vulnerability. This needs to be taught not only as a peripheral concern or an occasional “unit” inserted into putatively more “weighty” material, but as primacy, continuous, and pervasive responsibility. No one has made this point more cogently than Wendell Berry, who has argued that “at the very root of the idea of the profession…is the imperative to speak plainly in the common tongue” and to instill this ability in students. “How to make and how to judge are the business of education,” he continues, and “language is at the heart of the problem” (79). As part of the solution to the problem, particularly that of which Weingartner spoke, Berry further suggests that teachers of English should remember, and teach our students, that words are not things, but verbal tokens or signs that should be finally carried back to the things they stand for to be verified. It is this human act of carrying verbal tokens back to their specific referents and judging them on the basis of how accurately they conform to their referential reality that should be taught. Failure to do so will result in even greater problems of linguistic manipulation

## Solvency

#### Federal legislations fails—local law enforcement treats victims like criminals

Free the Slaves and Human Rights Center, ‘5 [Free the Slaves and Human Rights Center of the University of California Berkeley, “Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States,” Berkeley Journal of International Law, 23 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 47 2005]

Like the public, U.S. law enforcement is largely unaware of or poorly informed about the nature of forced labor and the plight of its victims. Because most victims of forced labor are undocumented workers or illegal aliens, law enforcement often regards them as criminals rather than victims ensnared in an illicit trade. This is largely because trafficking into forced labor is considered a federal crime. As a result, state and local law enforcement personnel lack basic training on identifying the crime, protecting victims, and bringing perpetrators to justice. Ironically, treating forced labor victims as criminals only makes it easier for an "employer" to get away with the crime because prosecutions rarely succeed without cooperative eyewitnesses.

#### No solvency – U.S. interventionism will recreate the problem

Melzer, writer for In These Times, 5 [Eartha, 3/14, http://www.religiousconsultation.org/News\_Tracker/trafficking\_in\_politics.htm]

Even worse, U.S. interventions around the world are contributing to the trafficking and exploitation of women. The State Department TIP report for 2003 noted that trafficking activities have increased in Afghanistan and Iraq as a consequence of instability brought on by armed conflict. "As we have seen elsewhere," the report stated, "the demand for prostitution often increases with the presence of military troops, expatriates and international personnel who have access to disposable income." On April 24, 2002, Ben Johnston, a helicopter mechanic for DynCorp in Bosnia, testified to Congress about DynCorp employees who were allegedly buying women and girls to keep in their homes as sex slaves. Yet, despite the president's "zero tolerance" directive and the development of laws that would hold contractors responsible for involvement in sex trafficking, DynCorp remains in good standing as a U.S. contractor, and in 2003 was awarded a no-bid contract to "re-establish police, justice and prison functions in post-conflict Iraq." In 2002, media reports detailed how "courtesy patrol" units around U.S. bases in Korea were directing soldiers and tourists to locations where they could engage the services of sex workers, mainly women from Russia and the Philippines who were held captive and forced to with soldiers. South Korean authorities estimated that their country's sex industry was worth $ 22 billion a year and involved 330,000 women.

## Util

#### **There’s a distinction between public and personal policy – Governments must make utilitarian calculations**

Goodin 95 – Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences at the Australian National University (Robert E., Cambridge University Press, “Utilitarianism As a Public Philosophy” pg 63)

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more plausible for them (or, more precisely, makes them adopt a form of utilitarianism that we would find more acceptable) than private individuals. Before proceeding with that larger argument, I must therefore say what it is that is so special about public officials and their situations that makes it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices-public and private alike- are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, at relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy makers to use the utilitarian calculus – if they want to use it at all – to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule. But they cannot be sure what the payoff will be to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that.

#### No tyranny of majority

Shaw, 99 – Professor of Philosophy @ San Jose State

(William H, Contemporary Ethics, p. 13)

Actions affect people to different degrees. Your playing the stereo loudly might bring slight pleasure to three of your neighbors, cause significant discomfort to two others who do not share your taste in music or are trying to concentrate on something else, and leave a sixth person indifferent The utilitarian theory is not that each individual votes on the basis of his or her happiness or unhappiness with the majority ruling, but that we add up the various pleasures or pains, however large or small, and go with the action that results in the greatest net amount of happiness. Because any action will affect some people more strongly than others, utilitarianism is not the same as majority rule. For example, in the United States today it would probably increase overall happiness to permit homosexuals to marry, even though the thought of their doing so makes many heterosexuals slightly uncomfortable. This is because such a policy would affect the happiness or unhappiness of the majority only slightly, if at all, while it would profoundly enhance the lives of a small percentage of people. Even if banning homosexual marriages makes most people happy, it doesn't bring about the most happiness.As quoted earlier, Bentham famously said that the utilitarian standard is the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Although often repeated, this formulation is misleading. The problem is that it erroneously implies that we should maximize two different things: the amount of happiness produced and the number of people made happy.' Correctly understood, utilitarianism tells us to do only one thing, maximize happiness. Doing what makes the most people happy usually produces the most happiness, but it may not - as the example of homosexual marriages illustrates. For utilitarianism, it is the total amount of happiness, not the number of people whose happiness is increased, that matters.

## War O/W

#### Our impacts turn yours-

Martin, Professor of Social Sciences in the School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication at the University of Wollongong, 1982

[Brian, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1982, pp. 149-159]

As mentioned earlier, one likely consequence of nuclear war, or even the threat of it, is declaration of states of emergency by national governments, detention of 'subversives' (trade union leaders, leaders of opposition parties, leaders of leftist groups, ethnic groups, feminists, etc.), and perhaps formal military rule. Plans, infrastructure and methods for such repressive measures already exist in many countries, having been developed to defend the status quo against various citizen based initiatives.[7] Furthermore, many plans for government action in the event of nuclear war seem specifically oriented to perpetuate the state structure rather than to defend people. The peace movement as well as the general population are not prepared for these contingencies, partly because nuclear war is seen as 'the end'. Yet if significant segments of the population were able to resist repression, to push for democratic initiatives and establish an alternative voice to that of the state in a nuclear emergency, the government and military would be much more reluctant to risk the occurrence of nuclear war. When the population is prepared, a nuclear war becomes a threat to the government itself as well as to the population. Resistance to repression is important now as well as in a nuclear emergency, and hence preparation, training and strategizing with this aim in mind serves a double purpose, and also links peace movement activities with other social movements.

#### C. People should decide their own life’s value but survival is a prerequisite

**Schwartz 2 –** Associate Professor of Medicine, Dartmouth(Lisa, Medical Ethics, http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf, AG)

This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not.

# 1nr

### middle east realism

#### Realist approaches in the Middle East are good

**Miller 10**, professor of IR – University of Haifa, (Benjamin, “Contrasting Explanations for Peace: Realism vs. Liberalism in Europe and the Middle East,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 31, Iss. 1)

¶ In what follows, I initially differentiate among types of regional security outcomes: hot/cold war and cold/warm peace. The task then is to examine what the different approaches suggest on the avenue to accomplishing peace in general and durable ‘warm’ peace in particular. Following a conceptual discussion of the realist approaches, I apply them to Europe and to the Middle East. In the next section I analyse the liberal conceptions of peace and security and then apply them to the two regions. On the whole, I show that the successful application of all four approaches brought regional peace to Europe – the realist strategies producing initially cold peace and then the liberal ones elevating it to warm peace. In contrast, **only** the **realist strategies were effective in the Middle East**, but much later than in Europe, and even then only partially, thus producing at best a fragile and partial cold peace.¶ In order to bring about peace to the Middle East, first of all the **realist mechanisms have to be implemented more forcefully** under an intensive hegemonic leadership. This leadership should be able to provide an effective security umbrella to the regional states taking part in the peace process against common revisionist threats. This leadership has then to focus on mediating key regional conflicts, but t**ogether with other international players and the regional actors,** it should also focus on **helping** state-building and nation-building processes in the region. Only then the liberal mechanisms can be effective and warm and stabilize the regional peace as was the case in post-1945 Western Europe.¶ *Hot war* is a situation of actual use of force aimed to destroy the military capabilities of the adversaries. **The Middle East is among the most violent-prone region**s in the post-WWII international system. Thus, major examples for hot war come from this region including the Arab–Israeli wars (1948–1999, 1956, 1967, 1969–1970, 1973, 1982 and most recently the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and the Cast Lead Operation of 2008–2009), the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) and the Gulf War of 1990–1991.¶ Cold war is a situation of negative peace[1](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0001) – a mere absence of hot war in which hostilities may break out any time. It is characterized by recurrent military crises and a considerable likelihood of escalation to war, either premeditated or inadvertent.2 The parties may succeed in managing the crises, avoiding escalation to wars while protecting their vital interests,[3](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0003) but they do not attempt seriously to resolve the fundamental issues in dispute between them. As to means employed by the parties, a cold war is characterized by the use of military forces for show-of-force purposes such as influencing the intentions of the regional rivals through deterrence and compellence.4 Diplomacy plays an important role in the parties' relations, but it is largely a diplomacy of violence – the use of military means for diplomatic ends – for signaling, crisis management, and to clarify interests, commitments, and ‘red lines’. An important component of cold war situations is the diplomacy of regional hot war termination, manifested in the establishment of cease-fires or armistices.[5](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0005) The presence of enduring rivalries in the region is a key indicator of a cold war there.6 Examples include the periods between the hot wars between Israel and its Arab neighbours, namely, 1949–1956, 1957–1967, 1968–1973, etc.¶ *Cold peace* is a situation characterized by formal agreements among the parties and the maintenance of diplomatic relations among them. The underlying issues of the regional conflict are in the process of being moderated and reduced, but are still far from being resolved. The danger of the use of force is thus unlikely in the near future, but it still looms in the background, and is possible in the longer run if changes in the international or regional environment occur. In one or more of the regional states there are still significant groups hostile to the other states, and thus the possible coming to power of belligerent opposition groups in these states may also lead to renewed hostilities or a return to cold war. The parties still feel threatened by increases in each other's power, and are concerned with relative gains.[7](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0007)¶ Military force is not used in the relations between the parties, not even for signalling and show-of-force purposes. Rather, the focus is on diplomatic means for the purposes of conflict reduction or mitigation,8 and the parties seriously attempt to moderate the level of the conflict through negotiations and crisis-prevention regimes.[9](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0009) These efforts, however, stop short of a full-blown reconciliation among the parties. Foreign relations among the regional parties are conducted almost exclusively through intergovernmental diplomacy, and there are limitations on transnational activity which involves non-governmental players. The parties still develop contingency plans that take into account the possibility of war among them. Such plans include force structure, defence spending, training, type of weapons, fortifications, military doctrine, and war planning.¶ **Examples include the Israeli–Egyptian peace** since 1979 and the Israeli–Jordanian peace since 1994. Intergovernmental negotiations succeeded to reach formal peace agreements between them. These peace accords have reduced the level of conflict between Israel and these two Arab neighbours. Especially critical is the peace between Israel and Egypt as the relations between them are the key strategic relations in the Arab–Israeli context. Since they have moved to the cold peace level, the likelihood of the eruption of a major inter-state Arab–Israeli hot war has drastically declined.

#### Calculative thought is necessary in order to secure justice in the face of specific forms of oppression

**Campbell 99 –** Professor of International Politics

David, Prof of Int’l Politics @ Univ. of Newcastle, Moral Spaces, p. 50-51

In pursuing Derrida on the question of the decision, a pursuit that ends up in the supplementing of Derridean deconstruction with Levinasian ethics, Critchley was concerned to ground political decisions in something other than the "madness" of a decision, and worried that there could be a "refusal of politics in Derrida's work" because the emphasis upon undecidability as the condition of responsibility contained an implicit rejection of politics as "the field of antagonism, decision, dissension, and struggle," the "domain of questioning s Yet from the above discussion, I would argue that Derrida's account of the procedure of the decision also contains within it an account of the duty, obligation, and responsibility of the decision within deconstruction. Moreover, the undecidable and infinite character of justice that fosters that duty is precisely what guarantees that the domain of politics bears the characteristics of contestation rightly prized by Critchley. Were everything to be within the purview of the decidable, and devoid of the undecidable, then (as Derrida constantly reminds us) there would be no ethics, politics, or responsibility, only a program, technology, and its irresponsible application. Of course, for many (though Critchley is clearly not among them), the certainties of the program are synonymous with the desires of politics. But if we seek to encourage recognition of the radical interdependence of being that flows from our responsibility to the other, then the provocations give rise to a different figuration of politics, one in which its purpose is **the struggle for-or on behalf of-alterity**, and not a struggle to efface, erase, or eradicate alterity. Such a principle -one that is ethically transcendent if not classically universal-**is a powerful starting point** for rethinking, for example, the question of responsibility vis-avis "ethnic" and "nationalist" conflicts.'°6 But the concern about politics in Derrida articulated by Critchley is not about politics per se, nor about the possibilities of political analysis, but about the prospects for a progressive, radical politics, one that will demand-and thus do more than simply permit-the decision to resist domination, exploitation, oppression, and all other **conditions that seek to contain or eliminate alterity**. Yet, again, I would argue that the above discussion demonstrates that not only does Derridean deconstruction address the question of politics, especially when Levinasian ethics draws out its political qualities, it does so in an affirmative antitotalitarian manner that gives its politics a particular quality, which is what Critchley and others like him most want (and rightly so, in my view). We may still be dissatisfied with the prospect that Derrida's account cannot rule out forever perverse calculations and unjust laws. But to aspire to such a guarantee would be to wish for the demise of politics, for it would install a new technology, even if it was a technology that began life with the markings of progressivism and radicalism. Such dissatisfaction, then, is not with a Derridean politics, but with the necessities of politics per se, necessities that can be contested and negotiated, but not escaped or transcended.

### Goldstein

#### The Link is Reverse Causal – The Potential for War is Inescapable and is the Root Construction of Gender Norms

Goldstein, Professor of IR @ American, 01

Joshua Goldstein Professor of IR @ American U 2001 War and Gender

In understanding gendered war roles, the potential for war matters more than the outbreak of particular wars. As Hobbes put it, war “consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.” Kant similarly distinguished between peace as it had been known in modern Europe through the eighteenth century – merely a lull or cease–fire – and what he called “permanent peace.” From 1815 to 1914, great–power wars largely disappeared, and some people thought warfare itself was withering away. But when conditions changed, the latent potential for warfare in the great–power system emerged again, with a vengeance, in the twentieth century. Thus, like a patient with cancer in remission, a society that is only temporarily peaceful still lives under the shadow of war.3 Plan of the book Chapter 1 describes a puzzle: despite the diversity of gender and of war separately, gender roles in war are very consistent across all known human societies. Furthermore, virtually all human cultures to date have faced the possibility, and frequently the actual experience, of war (although I do not think this generalization will last far into the future). In every known case, past and present, cultures have met this challenge in a gender–based way, by assembling groups of fighters who were primarily, and usually exclusively, male. The empirical evidence for these generalizations, reviewed in the chapter, shows the scope and depth of the puzzle. The chapter then reviews three strands of feminist theory that offer a variety of possible answers to the puzzle. From these approaches, I extract 20 hypotheses amenable to assessment based on empirical evidence (see Table 1.1). The results fill Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. All three feminist approaches turn out to contribute in different ways to understanding the puzzle of gendered war roles. Chapter 2 considers the numerous historical cases in which women for various reasons participated in military operations including combat. This historical record shows that women are capable of performing successfully in war. Thus, the near–total exclusion of women from combat roles does not seem to be explained by women’s inherent lack of ability. This evidence deepens the puzzle of gendered war roles. Many societies have lived by war or perished by war, but very few have mobilized women to fight. Why? Chapter 3 tests five explanations for the gendering of war based on gender differences in individual biology: (1) men’s genes program them for violence; (2) testosterone makes men more aggressive than women; (3) men are bigger and stronger than women; (4) men’s brains are adapted for long–distance mobility and for aggression; and (5) women are biologically adapted for caregiving roles that preclude participation in war. Each of these hypotheses except genetics finds some support from empirical evidence, but only in terms of average differences between genders, not the categorical divisions that mark gendered war roles. Chapter 4 explores dynamics within and between groups, drawing on animal behavior and human psychology. Several potential explanations come from this perspective: (1) “male bonding” is important to the conduct of war; (2) men operate better than women in hierarchies, including armies; (3) men see intergroup relations, as between the two sides in a war, differently from women; and (4) childhood gender segregation leads to later segregation in combat forces. The strongest empirical evidence emerges for childhood segregation, but that segregation does not explain the nearly total exclusion of women as combatants. Chapter 5 discusses how constructions of masculinity motivate soldiers to fight, across a variety of cultures and belief systems. Norms of masculinity contribute to men’s exclusive status as warriors, and preparation for war is frequently a central component of masculinity. I explore several aspects: (1) war becomes a “test of manhood,” helping overcome men’s natural aversion to participating in combat, and cultures mold hardened men suitable for this test by toughening up young boys; (2) masculine war roles depend on feminine roles in the war system, including mothers, wives, and sweethearts; and (3) women actively oppose wars. The last two of these contradict each other, but I argue that even women peace activists can reinforce masculine war roles (by feminizing peace and thus masculinizing war), creating a dilemma for the women’s peace movement. Overall, masculinity does contribute to motivating soldiers’ participation in war, and might do so less effectively with women present in the ranks. Chapter 6 asks whether, beyond their identities as tough men who can endure hardship, soldiers are also motivated by less heroic qualities. Misogyny and domination of women, according to some feminists, underlie male soldiers’ participation in war (thus explaining women’s rare participation as combatants). The chapter explores several diverse possibilities: (1) men’s sexual energies play a role in aggression; (2) women symbolize for male soldiers a dominated group and thus cannot be included in the armed ranks of dominators; and (3) women’s labor is exploited more in wartime than in peace, so patriarchal societies keep women in civilian positions. Chapter 6 explores both the men’s roles in these dynamics, and the corresponding women’s roles as prostitutes, victims, war support workers, and replacement labor for men at war. Chapter 7 concludes that the gendering of war appears to result from a combination of factors, with two main causes finding robust empirical support: (1) small, innate biological gender differences in average size, strength, and roughness; and (2) cultural molding of tough, brave men, who feminize enemies in dominating them. The gendering of war thus results from the combination of culturally constructed gender roles with real but modest biological differences. Neither alone would solve the puzzle. Causality runs both ways between war and gender. Gender roles adapt individuals for war roles, and war roles provide the context within which individuals are socialized into gender roles. For the war system to change fundamentally, or for war to end, might require profound changes in gender relations. But the transformation of gender roles may depend on deep changes in the war system. Multiple pathways of causality and feedback loops are common in biology, acting as stabilizing mechanisms in a dynamic system, and come to the fore at several points in this book. Although I focus mainly on gender’s effects on war, the reverse causality proves surprisingly strong. The socialization of children into gender roles helps reproduce the war system. War shadows every gendered relationship, and affects families, couples, and individuals in surprising ways. The diversity of war and of gender The cross–cultural consistency of gendered war roles, which this chapter will explore, is set against a backdrop of great diversity of cultural forms of both war and gender roles considered separately. Apart from war and a few biological necessities (gestation and lactation), gender roles show great diversity across cultures and through history. Human beings have created many forms of marriage, sexuality, and division of labor in household work and child care. Marriage patterns differ widely across cultures. Some societies practice monogamy and some polygamy (and some preach monogamy but practice nonmonogamy). Of the polygamous cultures, most are predominantly polygynous (one man, several wives) but some are predominantly polyandrous (one woman, several husbands). Regarding ownership of property and lines of descent, a majority of societies are patrilocal; women move to their husbands’ households. A substantial number are matrilocal, however, with husbands moving to their wives’ households. Most societies are patrilineal – tracing descent (and passing property) on the father’s side – but more than a few are matrilineal. Norms regarding sexuality also vary greatly across cultures. Some societies are puritanical, others open about sex. Some work hard to enforce fidelity – for example, by condoning killings of adulterers – whereas others accept multiple sexual relationships as normal. Attitudes towards homosexuality also differ across time and place, from relative acceptance to intolerance. Today, some countries officially prohibit discrimination against gay men and lesbians, while other countries officially punish homosexuality with death. Gender roles also vary across cultures when it comes to household and child care responsibilities. Different societies divide economic work differently by gender (except hunting). Political leadership, while never dominated by women and often dominated by men, shows a range of possibilities in different cultures, from near–exclusion to near–equality for women. Even child care (except pregnancy and nursing) shows considerable variation in the roles assigned to men and women. The areas where gender roles tend to be most constant across societies – political leadership, hunting, and certain coming–of–age rituals – are those most closely connected with war. Thus, overall, gender roles outside war vary greatly. Similarly, forms of war vary greatly, except for their gendered character. Different cultures fight in very different ways. The Aztecs overpowered and captured warriors from neighboring societies, then used them for torture, human sacrifice, and food. A central rack contained over 100,000 skulls of their victims. The Dahomey also warred for captives, but to sell into slavery to European traders. The Yanomamö declare that their wars are about the capture of women. The ancient Chinese states of the warring–states period sought to conquer their neighbors’ territories and populations intact in order to augment their own power. For the Mundurucú of Brazil, the word for enemy referred to any non–Mundurucú group, and war had no apparent instrumental purpose beyond being an “unquestioned part of their way of life.” The civil war in Lebanon had “no clear causes, no stable enemy… The chaos penetrated every aspect of daily life so that everyone participated always.”4 Some wars more than pay for themselves; others are economic disasters. The economic benefit of cheap oil was arguably greater than the cost of the Gulf War, for Western powers that chipped in to pay for the war. Similarly, the nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppes who invented warfare on horseback found profit in raiding. But the Vietnam War bankrupted the “Great Society” in the United States, and incessant wars between France and Spain drove both into bankruptcy in 1557. The Thirty Years War so devastated central Europe’s economy that the mercenary soldier was described as “a man who had to die so as to have something to live on.”5 Some wars seem almost symbolic because they absorb great effort but produce few casualties. Among the Dani of New Guinea, formalistic battles across set front lines – fought with spears, sticks, and bow and arrows – lasted from midmorning until nightfall or rain, with a rest period at midday, and with noncombatants watching from the sidelines. A different form of ritualistic war occupied the two superpowers of the Cold War era, whose nuclear weapons were built, deployed, and maintained on alert, but never used. Other wars, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the US Civil War, and the World Wars, were all–too–real spectacles of pain and misery that defy comprehension. A quarter of the Aztecs’ central skull rack could be filled by a single day’s deaths, 26,000 people, at the battle of Antietam.6 Some wars take place far from home, when armies travel on expeditions to distant lands. In the Crusades, European armies pillaged Muslim and Jewish communities for the glory of a Christian God. Later, European armies occupied colonies worldwide. Americans fought in the World Wars “over there” (Europe). Cuban soldiers in the 1980s fought in Angola. For traveling soldiers, home was a long way away, and for their home societies, war was distant. For most European peasants of the sixteenth century, war seldom impinged on daily life except through taxation. Other wars, however, hit extremely close to home. In recent decades, civil wars often have put civilians and everyday life right in the firing line. The World Wars made entire societies into war machines and therefore into targets. In such cases the “home front” and the “war front” become intimately connected. Sometimes soldiers kill enemies that they have never met, who look different from them and speak languages they do not understand. The Incas of Peru assumed the incomprehensible Spanish invaders to be gods. By contrast, in some wars neighbors kill neighbors, as in the 1992 Serbian campaign of terror in Bosnia. Soldiers sometimes kill at great distances, as with over–the–horizon air and ship missiles. At other times, they kill at close quarters, as with bayonets. Some, like the soldiers who planted land mines in Cambodia and Angola in the 1980s, have no idea whom they killed. Others, such as snipers in any war, can see exactly whom they kill. Combatants react in many different ways. Many soldiers in battle lose the ability to function, because of psychological trauma. But some soldiers feel energized in battle, and some look back to their military service as the best time of their lives. They found meaning, community, and the thrill of surviving danger. In many societies, veterans of battle receive special status and privilege afterwards. Sometimes, however, returning soldiers are treated as pariahs. Some soldiers fight with dogged determination, and willingly die and kill when they could have run away. In other cases, entire armies simply crumble because they lack a will to fight, as happened to the well–armed government forces in Africa’s third largest country, Zaire (Democratic Congo), in 1997. The puzzle. War, then, is a tremendously diverse enterprise, operating in many contexts with many purposes, rules, and meanings. Gender norms outside war show similar diversity. The puzzle, which this chapter fleshes out and the remaining chapters try to answer, is why this diversity disappears when it comes to the connection of war with gender. That connection is more stable, across cultures and through time, than are either gender roles outside of war or the forms and frequency of war itself. The answer in a nutshell is that killing in war does not come naturally for either gender, yet the potential for war has been universal in human societies. To help overcome soldiers’ reluctance to fight, cultures develop gender roles that equate “manhood” with toughness under fire. Across cultures and through time, the selection of men as potential combatants (and of women for feminine war support roles) has helped shape the war system. In turn, the pervasiveness of war in history has influenced gender profoundly – especially gender norms in child–rearing.

#### Ignoring The Causality Between War and Gender Makes Violence Inevitable – We Must Recognize the Social Conventions Created by Systems of War in Order to Deconstruct Gender Relations

Goldstein, Professor of IR @ American U, 01

Joshua Goldstein Professor of IR @ American U 2001 War and Gender

The persistent strength of “reverse causality” from war to gender pervades this study. The war system influences the socialization of children into all their gender roles – a feedback loop that strengthens and stabilizes gendered war roles. War’s influence shadows all of tour lives. Betty Reardon writes: “Once the actuality or possibility of war becomes the context within which we live, men and women are forced into set roles.” Gender serves as a medium or vector, as it were, for war’s presence in our most intimate social settings. Unfortunately, the spot for war on the bookstore’s gender shelf is nearly (though not quite) as empty as the spot for gender on the war shelf. For example, British feminist scholar Lynee Segal’s book on men and masculinity bypases war and the military, and treats “male violence” as meaning violence against women, keeping inter-male violence out of view. Mary Roth Walsh’s recent edited volume, covering the spectrum of gender topics, also omits war. So do many other works on gender. Denial may best explain these omissions. Social conventions keep war silent in our everyday lives because it represents trauma. Psychologist Judith Herman emphasizes the gulf between war and daily life: “The war story is closely kept among men of a particular era, disconnected from the broader society that includes two sexes and many generations. Thus the fixation on the trauma – the sense of a moment frozen in time – may be perpetuated by social customs that foster the segregation of warriors from the rest of society.” Historian John Keegan calls war “a world apart” from politics and diplomacy, “a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it.” (Jean Elshtain considers this seperation a European bourgeois phenomenon, however.) The single main lesson of this book for those interested in gender is to pay attention to war. To end denial and face war’s influence on gender is, I believe, an important step in changing both sexism and the war system.

#### No Risk of Solvency – Academia Proves That Others Will Be Highly Resistant or Ignore the Demand for Change Unless It is Framed in the Context of War

Goldstein, Professor of IR @ American U, 01

Joshua Goldstein Professor of IR @ American U 2001 War and Gender

In North American political science and history, male war scholars’ interest in the puzzle of gendered war roles has been minimal. The topic has not attracted the funding or publications among male scholars as, for example, the similarly intriguing regularity known as the “democratic peace” (democracies rarely fight each other). Feminist political scientists and historians – nearly all women – pay attention to gender in war, but others relegate gender to the dark margins beyond their (various) theoretical frameworks for studying war. Feminist literatures about war and peace of the last 15 years have made little impact as yet on the discussions and empirical research taking place in the predominantly male mainstream of political science or military history. This omission is measurable by counting the number of headings and subheadings in a book’s index on topics relating to gender. The typical political science and history books about war – the “big” books about war’s origins and history – score zero.56

Doyle’s recent and comprehensive survey of scholarship on war and peace contains six gender–related index entries but devotes only about one–tenth of 1 percent of its space to gender. All the gender references concern women; men still do not have gender. Similarly, when gender occasionally shows up in other mainstream war studies, it does so gratuitously, as a passing note – something that could be interesting, but plays no substantive role in any of the main competing theories about war. By contrast, anthropology – in North America and since decades ago – gives serious attention to gender–related subjects in studying war. Margaret Mead’s conclusion in the first major anthropological symposium on war (1967) called for paying “particular attention…to the need of young males to validate their strength and courage, and to…the conspicuous unwillingness of most human societies to arm women.” Anthropological thinking that connects war and gender is not limited to one ideological perspective, nor just to female scholars. Also, anthropology engages gender even though women are poorly represented among anthropologists studying war. Similarly, independent scholars outside of anthropology, political science, or history – such as Gwynne Dyer (a man) and Barbara Ehrenreich – have engaged both the mainstream war studies literatures and feminist theories of gender in war. And in 1929, sociologist Maurice Davie devoted two whole chapters of his book on war to gender.58 The gender blinders in mainstream war studies carry over to the foreign policy establishment. For example, a recent mainstream foreign policy book about “contending paradigms in international relations” – which sounds promising for the inclusion of gender – lacks any reference to gender in its 19 chapters, all written by men. The influential monthly Foreign Affairs did not carry a single article about gender issues in 1990–96. In 1998, an article on gender appeared, written by a man and arguing that biological gender differences make women more peaceful, so the “feminization of world politics” over the last century (since the suffrage movement) has created today’s “democratic zone of peace.” Foreign Affairs treated the article as a novelty, retitling it “What if Women Ran the World?” on the cover and illustrating it with bizarre century–old cartoons and photos of women in poses dominating men (e.g., with boxing gloves).59 The gender blinders also extend to male postmodern international relations scholars. Each of several recent edited volumes in postmodern international relations contains a requisite chapter about gender, written by a woman, and typically no mention of gender at all in the chapters written by men. In fact, the author’s gender is a highly significant predictor of whether the chapter includes or omits gender (see Table 1.2). Thus, even in postmodern international relations, gender is ghettoized.60

### Prolif

2. Turn—A. Plan causes bioweapons\*\*\*

Zilinskas Director, CBW Nonprolif Program, 2000

[After earning a Ph.D. in 1981, Dr. Zilinskas worked at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1981 - 1982), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (1982 - 1986), and the Center for Public Issues in Biotechnology, University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute. In addition, while at Maryland he was an Adjunct Associate Professor at the Department of International Health, School of Hygiene and Public Health, the Johns Hopkins University. In 1993, Dr. Zilinskas was appointed a William Foster Fellow at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), where he worked on biological and toxin warfare issues. In April 1994, ACDA seconded Dr. Zilinskas to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) for seven months, during which time he participated in two biological warfare-related inspections in Iraq (June and October 1994) encompassing 61 biological research and production facilities. At UNSCOM headquarters, he set up a database containing data about key dual-use biological equipment in Iraq and developed a protocol to guide UNSCOM's on-going monitoring and verification program in the biological field. After the fellowship ended, Dr. Zilinskas returned to the Center for Public Issues in Biotechnology and Johns Hopkins University. In addition, he became a long-term consultant to ACDA (which now is part of the U.S Department of State), for which he carried out studies on Cuban allegations of U.S. biological attacks against its people, animals, and plants and investigations carried out by the United Nations of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and the Arabian Gulf region. Dr. Zilinskas remains to this day a consultant to the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense. On September 1, 1998, Dr. Zilinskas began working as a Senior Scientist in Residence at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, CA. His research focuses on achieving effective biological arms control, the proliferation potential of the former Soviet Union's biological warfare program, and meeting the threat of bioterrorism. He also is a Research Professor at the Graduate School of International Politics at MIIS, where he teaches courses on biological and chemical weapons and arms control and emerging issues in international public health. Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense p1-2]

There are many who believe that today’s bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecular biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable and unreliable must change. The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be attempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, as tougher international controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, leaders may be even more drawn to biological arms as the most accessible form of weapon of mass destruction.

\*\*\*B.Bio attack causes extinction—could kill all health care workers making treatment and quarantine impossible.\*\*\*

Posner, federal appeals circuit judge who has written books on a variety of legal and social issues, 4 [Richard, *Catastrophe: Risk and Response*, Oxford University Press]

Yet before any of these dramatic climatic changes occurred, the human race might have exterminated itself through engineered plagues devised and disseminated by lunatics inspired with apocalyptic visions: With the aid of gene-splicing kits stolen from high school classrooms, religious terrorists and rogue scientists create a strain of the smallpox vaccine that is incurable, is immune to vaccine, and kills all its victims, rather than just 30 percent as in the case of natural smallpox. In a single round-the-world flight, a biological Unabomber, dropping off inconspicuous aerosol dispensers in major airports, infects several thousand people with the juiced-up smallpox. In the 12 to 14 days before symptoms appear, each of the initially infected victims infects five or six others, who in turn infect five or six others, and so on. Within a month more than 100 million people are infected, including almost all health workers and other "first responders," making it impossible to establish and enforce a quarantine. Before a vaccine or cure can be found, all but a few human beings, living in remote places, have died. Lacking the requisite research skills and production facilities, the remnant cannot control the disease and soon succumb as well.

### Prolif Will Be Slow

#### Proliferation will be slow

Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs,v1 n1, Winter/Spring 2000

It is now estimated that about twenty–five countries are in a position to make nuclear weapons rather quickly. Most countries that could have acquired nuclear military capability have refrained from doing so. Most countries do not need them. Consider Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. Argentina and Brazil were in the process of moving toward nuclear military capability, and both decided against it–wisely I believe–because neither country needs nuclear weapons. South Africa had about half a dozen warheads and decided to destroy them. You have to have an adversary against whom you think you might have to threaten retaliation, but most countries are not in this position. Germany does not face any security threats–certainly not any in which a nuclear force would be relevant. I would expect the pattern of the past to be the same as the pattern in the future, in which one or two states per decade gradually develop nuclear weapons.

#### And Rapid Prolif Doesn’t Make Sense – Nuclear Weapons Make Force Comparisons Irrelevant

Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995, p. 29-30

One may believe that old American and Soviet military doctrines set the pattern that new nuclear states will fol­low. One may also believe that they will suffer the fate of the United States and the former Soviet Union, that they will compete in building larger and larger nuclear arse­nals while continuing to accumulate conventional weap­ons. These are doubtful beliefs. One can infer the future from the past only insofar as future situations may be like past ones for the actors involved. For three main rea­sons, new nuclear states are likely to decrease, rather than to increase, their military spending. First, nuclear weapons alter the dynamics of arms races. In a competition of two or more parties, it may be hard to say who is pushing and who is being pushed, who is leading and who is following. If one party seeks to increase its capabilities, it may seem that others must too. The dynamic may be built into the competition and may unfold despite a mutual wish to resist it. But need this be the case in a strategic competition among nuclear countries? It need not be if the conditions of competition make deterrent logic dominant. Deterrent logic dominates if the conditions of competition make it nearly impossible for any of the competing parties to achieve a first-strike capability. Early in the nuclear age, the impli­cations of deterrent strategy were clearly seen. “When dealing with the absolute weapon,” as William T. R. Fox put it, “arguments based on relative advantage lose their point.” The United States has sometimes designed its forces according to that logic. Donald A. Quarles, when he was President Eisenhower’s secretary of the Air Force, argued that “sufficiency of air power” is deter­mined by “the force required to accomplish the mission assigned.” Avoidance of total war then does not depend on the “relative strength of the two opposed forces.” In­stead, it depends on the “absolute power in the hands of each, and in the substantial invulnerability of this power to interdiction.” To repeat: If no state can launch a dis­arming attack with high confidence, force comparisons are irrelevant. Strategic arms races are then pointless. Deterrent strategies offer this great advantage: Within ‘wide ranges neither side need respond to increases in the other side’s military capabilities.

#### More Evidence…

Colin Gray, Professor of International Politics at the University of Hull, “To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies,” Alternative Nuclear Futures, ed. Baylis and O’Neil, 2000, p. 5-6

The numbers of nuclear-weapon, and nuclear-threshold, states, remain much lower than proliferation pessimists were predicting in the 1950s and 1960s. There is no question but that the pace of proliferation has been slow and at present shows no thoroughly convincing signs of a prospect for other than a distinctly steady acceleration. But, this trend, if that is what it is, of a deliberate pace in proliferation, is vulnerable to nuclear learning from any crisis, anywhere that seems to demonstrate a strategic necessity for nuclear arms. The trend that has produced only five NPT-’licensed’ nuclear-weapon states—which happen to be the Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council—three unlicensed nuclear-weapon states (Israel, India, Pakistan), at least one near-nuclear-weapon threshold state (North Korea), and three would-be nuclear-weapon states (Iraq, Iran, Libya), is indeed impressive. Also it is impressive that, inter alia, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, and Taiwan, have stepped back from active pursuit of the military nuclear option. More noteworthy still was the renunciation in 1990 of actual, as opposed to virtual, nuclear weapons by a South Africa whose internal and external security condition has been transformed by and large for the better, and by the distinctly insecure extra-Russian legatees of part of the erstwhile Soviet nuclear arsenal.

### Prolif Solves War Module

#### Quantitative Historical Studies Prove Nuclear Weapons Deter Conflict

Victor Asal Political Science, State University of New York, Albany and Kyle Beardsley Department of Political Science, Emory University 2007 Journal of Peace Research; 44; 139 “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”

**The presence of nuclear weapons has an important and pacific impact**, a finding that lends support for an optimistic view of the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons. Waltz’s (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 7) contention that ‘the presence of nuclear weapons makes states exceedingly cautious’ seems to be borne out. Simply put, **when nuclear actors are present, states – both nuclear and non-nuclear – resort to violence less often, because they do not want to risk the exceptional costs of a nuclear strike.** Given the fact that much of the examination of this issue has been impressionistic (Geller, 2003), **this finding is important for our continuing effort to better understand the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear proliferation**, as well as its effects. We should also note **that this was a ‘hard’ test for the pro-proliferation argument – we are not asking if nuclear dyads are less likely to go to war.** Our analysis indicates that **the presence of nuclear-weapons states as crisis actors, regardless of which side they are on, decreases the likely level of violence. This fits with the theoretical arguments of proliferation optimists and rational-deterrence theorists**.

#### Prevents Miscalc Too

Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995, p. 6-7

Certainty about the relative strength of adversaries also makes war less likely. From the late nineteenth cen­tury onward, the speed of technological innovation in­creased the difficulty of estimating relative strengths and predicting the course of campaigns. Since World War II, technological advance has been even faster, but short of a ballistic missile defense breakthrough, this has not mat­tered. It did not disturb the American-Soviet military equilibrium, because one side’s missiles were not made obsolete by improvements in the other side’s missiles. In 1906, the British Dreadnought, with the greater range and firepower of its guns, made older battleships obso­lete. This does not happen to missiles. As Bernard Bro­die put it, “Weapons that do not have to fight their like do not become useless because of the advent of newer and superior types.”They may have to survive their like, but that is a much simpler problem to solve. Many wars might have been avoided had their out­comes been foreseen. “To be sure,” George Simmel wrote, “the most effective presupposition for preventing strug­gle, the exact knowledge of the comparative strength of the two parties, is very often only to be obtained by the actual fighting out of the conflict.” Miscalculation causes wars. One side expects victory at an affordable price, while the other side hopes to avoid defeat. Here the dif­ferences between conventional and nuclear worlds are fundamental. In the former, states are too often tempted to act on advantages that are wishfully discerned and narrowly calculated. In 1914, neither Germany nor France tried very hard to avoid a general war. Both hoped for victory even though they believed the oppos­ing coalitions to be quite evenly matched.

#### Even if They Win an Internal Link to Conflict Prolif Solves the Internal Link to Escalation

Chris Gagné, Research Associate, Confidence-Building Measures project 2001, “Nuclear Risk Reduction In South Asia: Building on Common Ground,” The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia, Report No. 38, June

In 1961, Glenn Snyder wrote, “the Soviets probably feel, considering the massive retaliation threat alone, that there is a range of minor ventures which they can undertake with impunity, despite the objective existence of some probability of retaliation.” Subsequent proxy wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan proved that the United States and the Soviet Union were willing to engage in violence below a certain, undefined threshold. Such conflicts illustrate what deterrence theorists have dubbed “the stability-instability paradox” which states that, “to the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of allout nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.” Today, the same rules seem to apply to South Asia where India and Pakistan fought a border war in 1999, one year after both tested nuclear weapons. In this instance, offsetting nuclear capabilities seem to have encouraged military adventurism on the part of Pakistan by creating pressure to keep conflicts localized and deterring a punitive Indian attack across the international border that might have escalated uncontrollably.

### Prolif Solves Indo / Pak

#### Indo-Pak conflict proves that prolif stops escalation even if it doesn’t prevent conflict.

Forsyth 12 (James Wood, Professor of International Relations at USAF, “The Common Sense of Small Nuclear Arsenals”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2012, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/summer/forsyth.pdf>) CC

The presence of nuclear weapons played a role in shaping the character ¶ of the Kargil conlict, the first conlict between nuclear-armed India and ¶ Pakistan. A retrospective look indicates that neither side actually threatened ¶ the other with the use of nuclear weapons.¶ 44 This was not clear during the ¶ conlict, however. According to one source, nuclear threats were issued ¶ between Pakistan and India no fewer than 13 times.¶ 45 The most promi­¶ nent of these was made by Pakistan’s foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad ¶ when he stated, “We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to ¶ defend our territorial integrity.”¶ 46 ¶ Additionally, it was believed that both ¶ sides increased their nuclear readiness levels.¶ 47 ¶ US intelligence agencies ¶ believed Pakistan had mobilized and was arming its missiles with nuclear ¶ warheads—a fact that caused President Clinton to lean heavily on Prime ¶ Minister Sharif to withdraw Pakistani forces and bring the conlict to an ¶ end.¶ 48 ¶ India, too, had reportedly placed its forces at “Readiness State 3”— preparing aircraft as well as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles ¶ for use.¶ 49 ¶ Whether overt threats were exchanged or nuclear forces mobilized ¶ seems to have mattered less than the presence of nuclear weapons. That is, ¶ nuclear weapons seem to have played a role in how each side fought dur­¶ ing the conlict. Of the two states, India was most notable for the restraint ¶ it put on its armed forces. Unlike in previous military responses to Paki­¶ stani aggression, Indian leadership took great care to avoid sending Indian ¶ forces into Pakistani territory.¶ 50 ¶ According to P. R. Chari, Indian forces ¶ “were under strict orders not to cross the LoC [Line of Control] under any ¶ circumstances. Hot pursuit of retreating enemy forces was not permitted, ¶ nor could their bases across the LoC be attacked.”¶ 51 ¶ Additionally, though ¶ it may have been militarily prudent to divert Pakistani attention, India ¶ refrained from taking the fight outside of the immediate Kargil region.¶ 52 ¶ Although the cover of nuclear weapons may have played a role in con­¶ vincing Pakistan it could get away with the initial incursion, when the ¶ miscalculation became apparent, Pakistan showed careful resolve to avoid ¶ further escalation. Like India, Pakistan may have beneitted from opening ¶ a second or multiple fronts, but even in the face of India’s successful ¶ counterofensive, Pakistan limited the fighting to the Kargil region.¶ 53 ¶ Nuclear weapons also ensured that diplomatic channels remained open ¶ between Pakistan and India throughout the conflict. Pakistani and Indian ¶ leadership met both officially and in secret in attempts to defuse the situation and prevent further escalation.¶ 54 The presence of nuclear weapons al­¶ most certainly ensured the international community took a more active role ¶ in ending the conflict. he United States, in particular, went to great lengths ¶ to encourage both India and Pakistan to avoid escalation and end the con­¶ lict. As noted above, pressure from President Clinton may have been the ¶ final deciding factor in Sharif’s decision to withdraw Pakistani troops.

#### Prolif Makes Indo / Pak War an Impossibility

Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, 2000 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs,v1 n1, Winter/Spring

Let’s turn our attention to the nuclear situation in South Asia. While nuclear weapons may have arguably helped stabilize the contentious relationship between India and Pakistan–no war has been fought since the introduction of nuclear weapons in the early 1970s–many observers worry that nuclear stability may not hold. What do you see as the prospects for stability? Waltz Stability in the subcontinent now exists; it had not existed since World War II and the partition of India and Pakistan. Now with nuclear weapons on both sides, India and Pakistan can no longer fight even a conventional war over Kashmir, as former General Beg and former General Sardarji both admitted. But we still fear instability such as the intractable dispute over the Kashmir. Yet the bitterness between the United States and the Soviet Union was deep enough during the Cold War, and deterrence worked. Why would India and Pakistan be different? Does India and Pakistan’s common border increase the risk? Probably not in a modern world where there are airplanes and missiles that can reach anywhere. What difference does it make that you’ve got a common border as long as it’s perfectly easy for the two countries in an adversarial relationship to reach each other? Geographic proximity may shrink warning time, but nuclear deterrence does not depend on being able to react with split–second timing. What’s the hurry? If you have received a damaging blow from another country and you’re going to retaliate, what difference does it make if you retaliate now, ten minutes from now, or tomorrow? A country still has that same fear of the retaliation, and **it’s that fear of retaliation that deters.**

#### India and Pakistan Prolif is Peaceful – No Risk of Escalation

Ramesh Thakur, Vice Rector of the United Nations University 2000 “The South Asian Nuclear Challenge,” Alternative Nuclear Futures, ed. Baylis and O’Neil, p. 110

Impressed by the oft-repeated argument that nuclear deterrence was respon­sible for the long peace between the cold war rivals, Indian and Pakistani strategists see no reason why the subcontinent should not enjoy a similar afterglow of weaponization. The theoretical argument on the beneficial effects of ‘the measured spread of nuclear weapons’ was made by Kenneth Waltz. In essence he argued that the likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defen­sive capabilities increase, and that the newer NWS can and will be socialized into the responsibilities of their new status. Stability-enhancing features of nuclear deterrence in general are given particular cogency in the case of Indo­-Pakistan hostility by features distinctive to their relationship. For example, propinquity and the pattern of population distribution would leave either India or Pakistan vulnerable to fallout from its own weapons used against the other, thereby producing a measure of self-deterrence.The wars between India and Pakistan have been exceptional in the degree of restraint shown by both sides. Neither has chosen to bomb civilian targets. A posture of threshold-NWS had already stabilized the *status quo.*The tests merely ‘brought into the open the nuclear reality that had remained clandestine for the past 11 years.

### Prolif Solves War – Moderates Behavior

#### Proliferation makes states less aggressive and curbs reckless foreign policy

Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995, p. 11-12

Second, many fear that states that are radical at home will recklessly use their nuclear weapons in pursuit of revolutionary ends abroad. States that are radical at home, however, may not be radical abroad. Few states have been radical in the conduct of their foreign policy, and fewer have remained so for long. Think of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. States coexist in a competitive arena. The pressures of competition cause them to behave in ways that make the threats they face manageable, in ways that enable them to get along. States can remain radical in foreign policy only if they are overwhelmingly strong—as none of the new nuclear states will be—or if their acts fall short of damaging vital interests of other nuclear powers. States that acquire nuclear weapons will not be regarded with indifference. States that want to be freewheelers have to stay out of the nuclear business. A nuclear Libya, for example, would have to show caution, even in rhetoric, lest it suffer retaliation in response to someone else’s anonymous attack on a third state. That state, ignorant of who attacked, might claim that its intelligence agents had identified Libya as the culprit and take the opportunity to silence it by striking a heavy conventional blow. Nuclear weapons induce caution in any state, especially in weaker ones.